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t

Conventional legal and economic analysis assumes that opportunistic behavior is discouraged and that cooperation is encouraged within firms primarily
through the use of legal and market incentives. This presumption is embedded in
the modern view that the corporation is best described as a "nexus of contracts," a
collection of explicit and implicit agreements voluntarily negotiated among the rationallv selfish partieswho join in the corporateenterprise. In this Article we take
a difjerent approach. We startfrom the observation that, in many circumstances,
legal and market sanctions provide, at best, imperfect means of regulatingbehavior within the firm. We consider an alternate hypothesis: that corporateparticipants often cooperate with each other not because of external constraints but because of internal ones. In particular,we argue that the behavioralphenomena of
internalized trust and trustworthinessplay important roles in encouraging cooperation within films.
In support of this claim, we survey the extensive experimental evidence that
has been produced over the past four decades on human behavior in "social dilemmas." This evidence demonstrates that internalized trust is a common phenomenon, that it is at least in part learned ratherthan innate, and that different
individuals valy in their inclinations toward trust. Most importantly, the experinental evidence indicates that decisions whether or not to trust others are in
large part determined by social context rather than external payoffs. By altering
social con text-subjects' perceptions of others' beliefs, expectations, likely actions,
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and relationshipsto themselves-experimenterscan reliablyproduce in subjects in
social dilemmas everythingfrom nearly universal trust to an almost complete absence of trust. In other words, most people behave as if they have two personalities
orpreferencefunctions. One is competitive and self-regarding. The other is cooperative and other-regarding. Socialframing is key in triggeringwhen the cooperative personalityemerges.
These behavioralfindings carry important implicationsfor corporate law. For
example, in this Article we demonstratefirst that the phenomenon of trust offers
insight into the substantive structure of corporate law and particularly into the
nature and purpose of that elusive legal concept, fiduciary duty. Second, the expeimental evidence on trust sheds light on how corporate law works, by suggesting
thatjudicial opinions in corporate cases influence corporateoffice' and directors'
behavior not only by alteringtheir external incentives but also by changing their
internalizedpreferences. This possibility helps explain the notoriously puzzling relationship between the duty of care and the businessjudgment rule. Third, trust
highlights the limits of law by explaining how cooperativepatternsof behavior can
sometimes develop within firms even when external incentives, such as legal sanctions, are unavailableor ineffective. In the process, it underscores the dangers of
the contractarianapproach by suggesting that an excessive emphasis on external
sanctions-includingformal contract and even the rhetoric of contract-may be
not only ineffective but counterproductive, serving to undermine trust and trustworthiness within thefirm.
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INTRODUCTION

A corporation is a collective enterprise. Shareholders and creditors provide financial capital, while managers and employees offer up
expertise, loyalty, and long hours. In making these contributions, individuals who participate in corporations often expose themselves to
great risk of loss from other participants' failures or misbehavior.' Yet
investments are made, companies are built, and value is created from
complex joint production.
How is this done? Contemporary legal scholarship generally assumes that shareholders, creditors, managers, and employees cooperate with each other because the market and the law give them incentives to do so. In accord with conventional economic analysis, these
parties are presumed to be rational actors concerned only with maximizing their own gains. Thus the primary factors thought to discourage corporate participants from stealing, shirking their duties, or otherwise mistreating each other are market incentives and legal rules,
including contract rules. These assumptions are embedded in the
modern view that the corporation is best understood as a "nexus of
contracts," a collection of express and implied agreements voluntarily
negotiated among the rationally selfish actors who join in the corporate enterprise.In this Article we take a different approach. Although we do not
abandon economic analysis, we revisit one of its basic assumptionsthe assumption that people always behave in a rationally selfish
fashion. We posit that corporate participants cooperate with each
) Shareholders and creditors obviously can lose their money. However, managers
and employees may also place themselves at risk if they invest in firm-specific skills and
knowledge or if they rely on implicit promises of future compensation or job security.
The risk of loss due to other participants' misbehavior is separate from and in addition
to ordinary business risks and risk of "bad luck."
Ss'
eMelvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts,
and the DualNatureof the Finn, 24J. CORP. L. 819, 819 (1998) ("[T]he conception that
the corporation is a nexus of contracts... has dominated the law-and-economics literature in corporate law."). Contractarian thinking so preoccupies modem corporate
scholarship that it is routinely discussed not only in introductory corporate law casebooks, see, r.g., LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS: LAw AND POLICY 517-33
(4th ed. 1998), but also in popular study aids, see, e.g., ROBERT NV. HAMILTON, THE LAW
OF CORPORATIONS IN ., NUTSHELL 52-62 (5th ed. 2000).
See Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: CooperationJ.ECON. PERSP.,
Summer 1988, at 187, 187 ("Much economic analysis-and virtually all game theorystarts xSith the assumption that people are both rational and selfish."). In questioning
the xSisdom of this assumption in the context of corporate law, we join the growring
ranks of scholars who have argued that the conventional "law and economics" approach should be modified to incorporate behavioral phenomena. See, e.g., Robert C.
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other not just because of external constraints, but because of internal
ones. In particular, we argue that the behavioral phenomena of internalized trust and trustworthinessplay important roles in discouraging
opportunistic behavior among corporate participants. (Because these
two behaviors are so closely linked, we sometimes
refer to the combi4
nation as "trust behavior," or simply "trust.")
We contend that people often trust, and often behave trustworthily, to a far greater degree than can possibly be explained by legal or
market incentives. Although this picture of internalized trust conflicts
with the neoclassical portrait of homo economicus as a hyperrational,
purely self-interested actor, it is supported not only by casual observation but by an overwhelming amount of empirical evidence. Decades
of experimental work on human behavior in "social dilemmas" establishes that trust is a reality.5 This work also demonstrates that people
do not trust randomly. To the contrary, a variety of factors have been
identified that predictably elicit greater or lesser degrees of trust.
One of the most important is social context-individuals' perceptions of
others' motivations, beliefs, likely behaviors, and relationships to themselves. By manipulating social context, experimenters can reliably
produce everything from nearly universal trust to an almost complete

Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical
Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 23, 23 (1989) (proposing that the law and
economics movement "should increasingly look to psychology and sociology"); Jon D.
Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation,74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 630 (1999) ("In recent years, legal scholars dissatisfied with the behavioral assumptions of the rational actor model have increasingly
turned to the findings of cognitive psychologists and decision theorists to enhance the
accuracy of efficiency analysis."); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1471 (1998) (offering "a broad vision of how law and
economics analysis may be improved by increased attention to insights about actual
human behavior"). For a general discussion, including a bibliography on behavioral
decisionmaking research, see Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories ofJudgment and
Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1499 (1998).
But see Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects, Other-Regarding Preferences, and
Corporate Law 2 (Apr. 21, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (noting that while some scholars have begun to apply a behavioral approach, "corporate
law.., has traditionally served as an intellectual bastion of economic conventionalism").
4 Trust and trustworthiness are linked in a number of ways. See infra
note 19 and
accompanying text (defining trust as depending on the expectation of trustworthiness); infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (discussing empirical findings that
trustworthy people are more likely to trust others); infra text accompanying note 74
(discussing findings that when trusting behavior is not responded to with trustw'orthiness, it tends to disappear).
See infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text (discussing empirical literature
on
trust).
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absence of trust among subjects in social dilemmas.
These behavioral findings have enormous importance for a wide
range of social and legal relationships and institutions in which cooperative, other-regarding behavior is of value. Examples include marriages, nonprofit firms, "relational" contracts, even the community as
a whole.' In this Article, however, we focus on one particular institution in which we believe trust plays an especially critical role-the
business corporation.
We believe that an understanding of the role of trust and of the
variables that encourage or discourage it is essential for understanding both the business world and much of corporate law. Focusing on
the role of trust sheds light on a number of debates and difficulties in
corporate scholarship. Examples include the nature of corporate fiduciary duties, the ways in which corporate case law constrains and directs behavior, and the puzzling persistence of cooperative patterns of
behavior in firms in circumstances in which legal and market sanctions are ineffective or unavailable. Accordingly, we suggest there is
tremendous value to be added by incorporating the phenomenon of
trust into legal scholarship. There is also danger in failing to do sodanger not only for academics but for lawmakers, practicing lawyers,
and businessfolk. This is because one of the most important lessons of
trust is that cooperation is not always best promoted by promising rewards and threatening punishments. To the contrary, attempts to
employ external incentives can often reduce levels of trust and trustworthiness within the firm by eroding corporate participants' internal
motivations.
We begin our analysis in Part I by defining what we mean by
"trust" and "trustworthiness." We describe trust as a willingness to

1,Sr, Eric A. Posner, Altrusim, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous

Pronid,,o,
1997 WIS.L. RErv. 567, 578 ("It has been increasingly recognized by academics
that some nonlegal mechanism such as trust must account for long-term or 'relational'
contracts.... Examples include the relationships among family members, long-term
supply contracts... and, in one view, the nonprofit corporate form .... "); Carol M.
Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betraya! 75 B.U. L. REv. 531, 534 (1995) ("First, pure rationality argues against trust. Second, people trust each other anyway. Third, it is very important that the) do so, because wthout trust, we could not undertake any cooperative
ventures, from the most trivial to the most cosmic."); see also, e.g., MILTON C. REGAN,
JR., ALoNE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEMNINGS OF LMRRIAGE 22-29 (1999) (arguing

that marriage often requires spouses to adopt an "internal stance" in which they internalize each others' welfare); Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89
YALE L.J. 835, 875-76 (1980) (discussing the importance of normative constraints and
preferences for serving others in nonprofit organizations); infra note 38 (citing
authorities on the importance of trust and "social capital" to communities).
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make oneself vulnerable to another, based on the belief that the
trusted person will choose not to exploit one's vulnerability (that is,
will behave trustworthily). We then develop the idea of trustworthiness as an unwillingness to exploit a trusting person's vulnerability
even when external rewards favor doing so. Our focus is on the importance of internal factors-tastes, preferences, intrinsic characterin producing trustworthiness that in turn encourages trust in others.
We then turn to the question of why trust and trustworthiness may
have special importance in business institutions. It is widely recognized that one of the most pressing economic problems associated
with doing business in the corporate form is the "agency cost" problem of encouraging managers, employees, and other corporate agents
faithfully to serve the firm's interests rather than their own. We have
also recently argued elsewhere that a second key economic problem
in corporations is the "team production" problem of encouraging
corporate participants to make mutual investments that expose them
to each other's opportunism.7 Market incentives and legal sanctions
can reduce agency costs and foster team production to some extent
But markets and law work best when the situation is transparent and
opportunistic behavior can be detected and punished. Trust can work
even when the situation is opaque. As a result, business firms that cultivate and support trust can enjoy a competitive advantage over those
that do not. This reality is well-recognized among management theorists and business consultants, who have produced an extensive literature on the importance of creating and maintaining trust within and
between business organizations." The centrality of trust to business
firms has been overlooked, however, by contractarian corporate
scholars who emphasize market incentives, enforceable contracts, and
other external constraints on opportunism within firms.
Why is this so? Part of the answer may lie in the observation that
7 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85
U. VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory]; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team Productionin Business Organizations: An Introduction,
24J. CORP. L. 743, 745 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Team Production in Business
Organizations] (describing the "team production" problem). See generally Symposium,
Team Productionin Business Organizations,24J. CORP. L. 743 (1999).
8 See, e.g.,JoRDAN D. LEWIS, TRUSTED PARTNERS: How COMPANIES BUILD MUTUAL
TRUST AND WIN TOGETHER (1999); TRUST WITHIN AND BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS
(Christel Lane & Reinhard Bachmann eds., 1998); Aneil K. Mishra, OrganizationalResponses to Crisis: The Centraliy of Trust, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF
THEORY AND RESEARCH 261-87 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996); Special Topic Forum on Trust in and Between Organizations,23 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 384 (1998);
sources cited infra note 49.
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trust behavior in business firms often occurs in circumstances in which
cooperation is consistent with, rather than contrary to, external legal
and market incentives.9 When a manager refrains from stealing, she
may do this because she is intrinsically trustworthy, but she may also
do it because she is afraid of being fired or ending up in jail. As a result, it can be tempting to assume that external incentives cause all the
cooperative, coordinated behavior we observe. Legal scholars may be
particularly prone to jump to this conclusion. Legal analysis focuses
on case law, and case law usually involves situations in which trust and
cooperation have broken down and the parties seek to invoke legal
sanctions. Hence, it may be especially easy for legal scholars to assume that it is the threat of the law that reins in misbehavior in all
situations.
We demonstrate in Part II that such an assumption is mistaken.
We do this by reviewing the extensive empirical evidence that has
been developed on trust, focusing particularly on experimental studies of behavior in "social dilemmas." Social scientists use the phrase
"social dilemma" to refer to situations that present incentives resembling those in the more familiar "prisoner's dilemma" game, such that
cooperating is the worst strategy for the individual but the best for the
group as a whole. Experimental evidence of behavior in social dilemma games is highly relevant to trust for two reasons. First, the optimal outcome requires the players both to trust (to make themselves
vulnerable by cooperating) and to be trustworthy (to refrain from "defecting" and exploiting the vulnerability of the other players). Second-and in marked contrast to the business world, where trust behavior often is consistent with external incentives-a social dilemma
experiment can be structured to eliminate any possibility of external
incentive for cooperation. Social dilemma experiments thus isolate
and highlight the pervasive and powerful effects of internalized trust.
What do social dilemma experiments teach us? Over the past four
decades, experimenters have conducted hundreds of these studies.
Five interesting and consistent results have emerged from these efforts. First, social dilemma experiments irrefutably demonstrate that
human beings do not behave in the strictly individualistic and selfinterested way that economic theory often implies they do. Rather,
they behave as if they sometimes have a preference or "taste" for cooperative, other-regarding behavior generally and for trusting and
"1Sr bifra text accompanying note 98 (discussing how reducing the
cost associated
uith trustworthy behavior increases the incidence of trust).
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trustworthy behavior specifically. 10 Second, the evidence suggests that
different individuals vary in their willingness to trust and to be trustworthy in new situations. Thirdly, these differences seem due at least
in part to differences in experience, hinting that trust may be a
learned behavior.
But even among those inclined toward trust, their inclination is
not absolute. A fourth fundamental finding of the social dilemma
studies is that trust is socially contingent. Individuals in social dilemmas
decide to cooperate or defect not primarily by calculating their individual payoffs but instead by looking at and trying to decipher others'
beliefs, likely behaviors, and social relationships with themselves. For
example, experimenters have found that cooperation in social dilemmas is dramatically enhanced when the experimenter states (or
even hints) that the players ought to cooperate, when the players
share a sense of group identity, and when the players expect their fellows to behave cooperatively. These are striking findings because such
social variables do not change the economic structure of the game.
Defecting remains the optimal strategy for the self-interested player.
The observation that social context plays a critical role in determining whether individuals trust or distrust should not be taken to
imply, however, that economic variables are irrelevant. A fifth significant finding of social dilemma experiments is that, even while people
cooperate far more than the homo economicus model would predict,
trust behavior does respond to economic incentives. In particular, as
the personal cost of choosing cooperation over defection rises for individual players, the likelihood of cooperation decreases. Although
most people are willing to behave in an other-regarding fashion when
the social context is right and the personal sacrifice involved is relatively small, as the cost of trust rises, trust tends to disappear.
Taken as a whole, the experimental evidence consequently indicates that most people behave as if they have two personalities or preference
functions." In some social contexts they are competitive and behave
10 Trust

behavior is other-regarding, see infra note 11; infra text accompanying

notes 29-30. However, it is not the only possible kind of other-regarding behavior. See
Anthony M. Yezer et al., Does Studying Economics Discourage Competition? Watch 117at W
Do, Not Whzat We Say or How WePlay,J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1996, at 177, 180-86 (discussing "lost letter" experiments that test altruism not involving trustful reliance); mfra
note 30 (discussing vengefulness). We focus on trust here because of its special importance in business firms.

n In this Article we take a behavioral approach to trust. In other words, we do not
offer a cognitive theory of the motives underlying trust, but rather rely on experimental evidence to identify the social and economic variables that increase the likelihood
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selfishly. But when the social conditions are right, their cooperative,
other-regarding personalities emerge. Social "framing," tempered by
considerations of personal costs, plays a critical role in determining
whether or not individuals choose to trust and be trustworthy.
In Part III, we consider how the insights developed in Parts I and
II shed light on three enduring puzzles in corporate scholarship. The
first is the nature and meaning of the concept of fiduciary duty. We
argue that the phenomenon of trust aids our understanding of the
elusive idea of fiduciary obligation because it suggests that the essence
of a fiduciary relationship is the legal expectation that the fiduciary
will adopt the other-regarding preference function that is the hallmark of trustworthy behavior. Moreover, the law encourages fiduciaries to do this not only or even primarily by threatening punishment
but by framing the relationship between the fiduciary and her beneficiary as one that calls for a psychological commitment to trustworthy,
other-regarding behavior. This approach offers important insights
into the bitter and ongoing debate between "contractarian" and "anticontractarian" corporate scholars over whether officers' and directors'
fiduciary duties ought to be thought of as just another set of negotiable provisions in the nexus of contracts that supposedly makes up the
firm. " , In particular, it supports the anticontractarian position that allowing corporate fiduciaries to "opt out" of their loyalty duties would
undermine the principal function of the fiduciary concept-to trigger
trust behavior by signaling that the social context calls for trust.
We then turn to a second mystery of corporate law-the puzzling
relationship between the corporate director's duty of care and the
business judgment rule.' Case law supposedly requires directors to
of trust behavior. If one assumes, as economists generally do, that behavior reflects

txstcs and "revealed preferences," the evidence suggests that most people shift readily
from a self-centered, I-oriented preference function that considers only their own payofis, to an other-regarding, we-oriented preference function that incorporates concern
for others' welfare.
) The literature addressing the "opt out" debate is too vast to cite in its entirety
here. Classic contributions include: Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting ContractualFreedom

in Curprate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARv. L. REV.
1820 (1989); Victor Brudney, CorporateGovernance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Conhad, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Henry N. Butler & Lary E. Ribstein, Opting Out
,,f
FiduciarvDuties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians,65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990);John
C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatoi'/EnablingBalance in CorporateLaw: An Essay on theJudicial
Rob, 89 COLUM.L. REv. 1618 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.Fischel, The
Coporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1416 (1989); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory
Structurof Coyporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1549 (1989); see also sources cited infra
note% 115, 117, 137, 143.
) The relationship between the duty of care and the business judgment rule is one
of the thorniest problems in contemporary corporate law. See ROBERT C. CLXRK,
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exercise due care. This requirement, however, is rarely enforced.
While judges frequently moralize about the importance of care, the
business judgement rule and a variety of other doctrines and arrangements ensure that careless directors are largely immune from
any realistic threat of monetary liability. If one views directors as
purely self-interested actors, this inevitably raises the question of why
directors of publicly held corporations (who are often significantly insulated from shareholders'-or anyone's-control) should be expected to exercise due care. The phenomenon of trust offers an answer. By articulating a social expectation that directors will exercise
due care, judicial opinions on the duty of care may influence directors' behavior not so much by changing their external incentives as by
changing their internal preferences. 4 This approach explains the
schizophrenic quality of modern case law on the duty of care, which
generally exhorts directors to meet a high standard of behavior while
simultaneously declining to impose liability for failing to meet that
standard.
Finally, we consider how trust highlights the potentially limited
importance of law in promoting cooperation in firms. To illustrate,
we consider the case of the closely held corporation. It is widely recognized that participants in closely held corporations face a high risk
CORPORATE LAw 124 (1986) ("Is the duty of care simply gobbledygook?"); Stuart R
Cohn, Demise of the Director'sDuty of Care: JudicialAvoidance of Standards and Sanctions
Through the BusinessJudgmentRule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591 (1983) (criticizing the business
judgment rule); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergenceof Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in CorporateLaw, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Divergence] (discussing the divergence between the standard of due care and the
business judgment rule); Daniel R. Fischel, The BusinessJudgment Rule and the Trans
Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437, 1438 (1985) (criticizing case law on the business
judgment rule as lacking "a coherent theory"); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The BusinessJudgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 287, 288-89
(1994) (arguing that the business judgment rule is "either meaningless... or misguided"); Bayless Manning, The BusinessJudgmentRule and the Director'sDuty of Attention:
Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAw. 1477, 1478 (1984) (arguing that judicial formulation of
the duty of care "is both out of contact with reality and is analytically unsound"); Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware CorporateLaw Work?, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1009, 1010-11 (1997) (discussing the divergence between the standard of due
care and the business judgment rule).
14 Outside the corporate context, a number of scholars have argued that law can
perform such an "expressive" or "preference-shaping" function. See, e.g., Robert
Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Kenneth G. DauSchmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990
DUKE L.J. 1; Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions lean?,63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591
(1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. RE,. 943
(1995); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021
(1996). Our analysis contributes to this literature by providing insight into the underlying behavioral mechanism.
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of loss from their fellow participants' opportunism and that legal and
market incentives provide imperfect solutions to such mutual vulnerability." We explore how other forces can supplement the market and
legal rules as means of deterring misbehavior in closely held firms. In
particular, we consider how processes of self selection and partner selection may favor the participation of high-trust individuals in closely
held firms while working to exclude those who are less likely to trust
and be trustworthy. This approach suggests how cooperative relationships can develop and thrive in the absence of law or markets. It also
illustrates how using legal rules, including contract, to discourage opportunistic behavior can, in some situations, be not only unnecessary
but counterproductive, increasing the likelihood of the very sort of
misbehavior against which it was intended to protect.
WAe conclude in Part IV that the time has come to incorporate the
reality of trust behavior into the analysis of corporations and corporate law. One of the most important lessons of the experimental evidence on trust behavior is that trust often depends on social context.
Case law, statutes, lawyers' memoranda, and even scholars' writings
are part of that context. When lawmakers, scholars, and practicing
attorneys fail to take account of trust, they may not only fail to understand behavior within the firm-they may distort it.
I.

THE IDEA AND EFFICIENCY OF TRUST

Scholars sometimes use the term "trust" in different ways to mean
different things.' In this Article, we use the word "trust" to describe
behavior with the three following characteristics. First, trust involves

1 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporationsand Agency
Costs, 38 STAN. L. REv. 271 (1986) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations]; Paul G. Mahoney, Trust and Opportunism in Close Corporations,in CONCENTRATED
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death
of FiduciaryDuty in Close Corporations,138 U. PA. L. REv. 1675 (1990); Douglas K. Moll,
Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered Question of Perspective, 53
VAND. L. REV. 749 (2000); Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation
Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 216 (1992); Edward B. Rock &
Michael L. Wachter, Waitingfor the Omelet To Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations,24J. CORP. L. 913 (1999); Eric Talley, Taking the "I" Out of
"Team"- Intra-Firm Monitoring and the Content of Fiduciary Duties, 24 J. CORP. L. 1001
(1999).

1"See Craig D. Parks et al., Trust and Reactions to Messages of Intent in SocialDilemmas,
40J. CONFLICT RESOL. 134, 135-36 (1996) ("[Tlhere is no universally accepted definition of trust."); Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization,
36J.L. & ECON. 453, 453 (1993) (-'[T] rust' is a term with many meanings.").
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is trusted. 17
at least two actors-the actor who trusts and the actor who
Second, the trusting actor must deliberately make herself vulnerable
to the trusted actor in circumstances in which the trusted actor could
benefit from taking advantage of the trusting actor's vulnerability.1 "
Third, the trusting actor must make herself vulnerable in the belief or
expectation that the trusted actor will in fact behave "trustworthily"that is, refrain from exploiting the trusting actor's vulnerability. Trust
and trustworthiness accordingly are closely linked, with the former
depending upon an expectation of the latter."'
Consider the following example. Ann wants to spend the summer
overseas. Beth has a summer job in Ann's city and needs a place to
live. Ann thinks that the valuable art collection in her apartment will
be safer if the apartment is occupied, so she offers to let Beth live in
the apartment for the summer if she waters the plants, refrains from
throwing wild parties, and locks the door when she goes out. Ann has
chosen to make herself vulnerable, because Beth could gain at Ann's
expense by stealing or shirking (for example, stealing the art collection or neglecting the plants). Ann decides to do this because she expects Beth to behave "trustworthily" by caring faithfully for the apartment.
A. Sources of Trust and Trustworthy Behavior
Why would someone voluntarily expose herself to the risk of loss
from another's acts? We explore several different answers below, each
focusing on the trusting party's belief or expectation that the trusted

17 The

trusted actor could be a person or, possibly, an institution such as "the firm"
itself. See infra text accompanying notes 108-10, 204 (discussing trust in nonhuman
institutions).
18See Mishra, supra note 8, at 265 ("Trust is one party's willingness to be vulnerable
to another party. ... Without vulnerability, trust is unnecessary...." (internal citations
omitted)). Trust thus implies volition on both sides.
19 In our formulation, the expectation of trustworthy behavior is a necessary counterpart and inducement to trust. We argue below that people may behave trustworthily
for a variety of reasons, some self-interested and some not. But where intrinsic trustworthiness exists, trust itself can be rational. Hence the puzzle in our story is why homo
economicus would be intrinsically trustworthy in the first place. Some theorists go further and argue that true trust is not based on rational calculations of others' likely behavior. See, e.g., Gary Alan Fine & Lori Holyfield, Secrecy, Trust, and DangerousLeisure:
GeneratingGroup Cohesion in Voluntary Organizations,59 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 22, 25 (1996)
("One not only thinks trust, but feels trust."). Although our argument does not depend on this view, there is evidence to support it. See infra text accompanying note 71
(discussing how the psychological phenomenon of projection may lead trustworthy

people to assume others are also).
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party has reason to behave trustworthily. We see these reasons as being layered like an onion, with the outside layers representing the
most obvious and calculating of reasons and the inside layers representing deeper sources of trust that spring from the trusting party's
views about the personal preferences and basic character of the
trusted party.
1. Legal Sanctions
The most obvious reason why Ann might trust Beth would be that
Ann knows that untrustworthiness might subject Beth to legal sanctions.
For example, Ann might "trust" Beth not to steal her art collection
because to do so would be theft, and Ann knows that Beth knows that
stealing is illegal.
The notion that legal rules are needed to curb opportunistic behavior dates back at least to Thomas Hobbes." ' But consider the magnitude of the information and the resources needed for legal sanctions, alone, to work. Ann must be able to detect Beth's illegal act and
Beth must know Ann can do so. (This could be a problem, for example, if Beth claims that the art collection was stolen by a burglar.)
Both parties must believe that there is a high probability that a theft
would be prosecuted or that a civil claim would be brought, that the
court would find Beth guilty or liable, and that Beth would be punished or required to pay damages. And both parties must believe that
the resulting sanction would be severe enough (after discounting for
the possibility that Beth's treachery would never be discovered or successfully sanctioned) to make the theft unattractive.
These strong requirements suggest that, in many cases, the threat
of legal sanctions will impose only a weak constraint on Beth's behavior. The obvious corollary is that legal rules may rarely be the sole, or
even primary, reason Ann would trust Beth.
2. Market Sanctions
Going deeper, we find a second category of reasons for Ann to believe that Beth will behave trustworthily. This second category rests on
the notion that Beth might have external incentives to refrain from
abusing Ann's trust if stealing or shirking would signal to others in the
marketplace-including Ann herself-that Beth cannot be trusted.
Ann might calculate, for example, that she can trust Beth because if
SweTHONLks HOBBES, LEVIATi-LvN (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968) (1651).
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the plants die or any of the art disappears, Ann can retaliate by either
declining to deal with Beth in the future or by requiring her to put up
a substantial deposit if she wants to use Ann's apartment the next
summer.

21

Even if Ann and Beth are unlikely to deal with each other again,
similar considerations apply in situations in which they are likely to
deal with third parties who know each of them. If Beth is a research
assistant for one of Ann's colleagues, for example, Beth might fear
that if she does not care for Ann's apartment faithfully, her reputation
for trustworthiness among Ann's colleagues might suffer. Thus, Beth
might do a good job not because she fears that Ann will refuse to deal
with her in the future but because she fears that other potential trading partners will shun her. 22 It is also possible that third parties might
not only become more reluctant to do business with Beth but also subject her to cold stares, unpleasant remarks, and other "social sanctions." This latter possibility provides the foundation for much of the
mushrooming contemporary literature on law and social norms.2 3
In this Article we combine fear of retaliation, reputational loss,
and social sanctions together under the label of market sanctions, because all three constrain and direct behavior by changing individuals'
perceptions of their future opportunities for beneficial exchanges
with others.24 Rational choice theorists have placed a great deal of
emphasis on such external rewards and punishments as sources of
trust. For example, in his preeminent article on "calculative" trust,
Like the related strategy in game theory, trust based on fear of retaliation might
also be termed "tit-for-tat" trust. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EvOLUTION OF
COOPERATION (1984) (discussing the tit-for-tat strategy); S.S. Komorita et al., Reciprocity
and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 35J. CONFLICT RESOL. 494 (1991) (studying the effectiveness of tit-for-tat strategies in eliciting cooperation in social dilemmas); S.S. Ko21

morita et al., Reciprocity and the Induction of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 62 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 607 (1992) [hereinafter Komorita et al., Reciprocity and
Induction] (outlining experiments concluding that tit-for-tat strategies are effective in
inducing cooperation).
22 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal
ContractualRelations in the Diamond Industry, 21J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 116 (1992) (discussing the importance of reputational concerns in ensuring compliance with industry norms).
23 See generallyRichard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, and Regulation of Social
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 343-46 (1997) (reviewing the literature on law and
norms).
24 Cf Roderick M. Kramer, Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Emerging
Perspectives,
EnduringQuestions,50 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 569, 573 (1999) ("'When trust is justified by
expectations of positive reciprocal consequences, it is simply another version of eco-

nomic exchange, as is clear from treatments of trust as reputation in repeated games
... .'" (quoting JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSON, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS:
THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 27 (1989))).
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Oliver Williamson argues that most of what we call trust in commercial
exchange is actually strategic behavior driven by the fear of retaliation
or loss of reputation.25 (Although Williamson does not entirely dismiss the idea of noncalculative trust, he suggests that it is "irrelevant
to commercial exchange."!)

Similarly, much norms scholarship ulti-

mately relies on market sanctions as an explanation for cooperative
behaxior, although the "market" in question includes social, as well as
obviously economic, exchanges."
SecWilliamson, supra note 16, at 463, 485-86 (using the phrase "calculative tust"
to describe trust in business relationships, while noting that the phrase is "a contradiction in terms," and arguing that it is misleading and confusing to use the word "trust"
in connection with commercial relationships).
u,id. at 483 (suggesting also that the idea of noncalculative trust be reserved
for
describing personal relationships).
a7Norms scholars frequently describe norms as behavioral rules that are enforced
not by courts but primarily by social sanctions imposed by third parties on normbreakers. Set, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Lawfor a Complex Economy: The StructuiralApproach to AdjudicatingtheNew Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643, 1665, 166869 (1996) (suggesting that third-party enforcement is important in explaining the
emergence of norms); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA.
L. REx. 1697, 1699 (1996) ("[A] norm is like a law, except that a private person sanctions the violator of a norm, whereas a state actor sanctions the violator of a law.");
Rock, supra note 13, at 1013, 1104 (focusing on the role of reputational concerns and
social sanctions as reasons to obey norms); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social
Rol, 96 COLUM. L. Rv. 903, 915 (1996) (discussing norms as enforced through social
sanctions). Thus, much norms scholarship ultimately relies on the homo economicws
model in explaining cooperative behavior.
There is an important puzzle associated with this approach. Note that Beth might
care about her reputation for two reasons. First, Beth might hope to gain economically from cooperative business relationships with others around her. Even rationally
selfish outsiders might avoid doing business with an untrustworthy Beth, and a rationally, selfish Beth would fear such avoidance. But Beth may also worry' about her reputation simply because she cares about others' opinions and does not want to be subject
to dirt)' looks, rude remarks, and social ostracism. This second possibility seems inconsistent with rational selfishness. Why does Beth care about others' opinions? And
given that Beth cares, why should others invite conflict with her by socially sanctioning
her, when conflict can be costly and the benefits of doing so flow largely to others? See
McAdams, supra note 23, at 352, 355 (noting that "if sanctioning is costly, as most
analyses assume, the puzzle is to explain why individuals will ever begin to sanction violators" and suggesting that third parties enforce norms by costlessly withholding "esteem" from violators); see also Cooter, supra, at 1665, 1667-69 (suggesting that thirdparty enforcers must "internalize" norms); Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori S. Singer, Norm
Enforcement in a Noncooperative Setting (Oct. 4, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on
file ith authors) (discussing numerous accounts of instances when third parties employed social sanctions against strangers to enforce handicapped parking rules at significant personal cost, including threat of injury). See generally Lynn A. Stout, OtherRegarding Preferences and Social Norms (Mar. 2, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with authors).
The experimental evidence on trust behavior offers insights into how social norms
are created and enforced by helping to illuminate the circumstances under which
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Fear of retaliation, loss of reputation, and social sanctions may indeed provide important motives for cooperative behavior in many social interactions. But such motivations continue to rely on a view of
people as always strategic, calculating, and self-interested. Moreover,
note again the demanding information and resource requirements
that must be met for such external forces to constrain Beth and,
therefore, to provide the basis for Ann's trust in Beth. Beth must
know that if she behaves untrustworthily, Ann will realize that her resulting loss was due to Beth's unfaithfulness rather than to bad luck or
other factors. Beth must also know that Ann will be willing to incur
the future cost of not doing business with Beth in order to punish
Beth, or the possibly higher cost of making it widely known to other
potential trading partners that Beth abused Ann's trust. In the latter
case, Beth must know that others will be able to verify that Beth
abused Ann's trust (or at least be willing to believe Ann) and will inflict costs on Beth by refusing to do business with her, charging her a
higher price, or punishing her with social sanctions. Finally, Ann
must know that Beth knows all of these things.
Because the costs involved in employing legal and market sanctions to enforce trustworthiness can be so high, there is reason to suspect that other influences may be at work as well. Calculative trust
may not be all, or even the most important part of the story.
3. Internalized Trust
So we turn finally to the deepest layer of the onion-the constraints on Beth's behavior that may come from Beth's internalized
belief that she ought not to abuse Ann's trust. We posit that in some
circumstances Beth may have a taste or preference for behaving trustworthily toward Ann, even if untrustworthy behavior would not trigger
any external sanction. If Ann believes that Beth's desire to behave
trustworthily is strong enough to deter Beth from taking advantage of
Ann, Ann may conclude it is safe to make herself vulnerable to Beththat is, to trust Beth.
Henceforth we shall use the term "trust" to refer to this sort of inpeople adopt other-regarding preferences. Other-regarding preferences, in turn, explain both why people are willing to incur costs to comply with social norms and why
they are willing to incur costs to enforce them.
28 One has to ask why Ann might be willing to spread the word that Beth had

abused her trust. This could be quite costly to Ann if others took it as a signal that Ann
was gullible or vindictive. See supra note 30 (discussing vengefulness); note 27 (discussing third-party enforcement of social norms).
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ternalized trust and not to calculative behavior motivated by external
rewards or sanctions. This idea of trust driven by expectations of intrinsic trustworthiness bears a much closer resemblance to the lay understanding of trust than the economists' notion of calculative trust
does. Dictionary definitions of trust, for example, center on the
trusted person's essential integrity and character, rather than on
whether he or she has external incentives to refrain from exploiting
another."
But the idea of internalized trust also poses a fundamental challenge to the neoclassical model of human behavior driven by rational
self-interest. Internalized trust implies either that Beth altruistically
feels some degree of concern for Ann's welfare (inconsistent with
pure selfishness)"' or that she does not recognize that she could benefit from behaving untrustworthily (inconsistent with rationality). The
resulting tension between trust and rational self-interest may explain
why economists and legal scholars who rely on economic analysis tend
to focus on the role external incentives play in explaining cooperative
behavior in general and trust behavior in particular.' This tendency
See, tg., RaNDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2031 (2d ed.
1987) (defining trust as "reliance on the integrity, strength, ability, surety, etc. of a person or thing"); WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1246 (1979) (defining trust
as "assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something").
' For a variety of reasons, the word "altruism" may be inadequate
to describe the
phenomenon we examine. First, altruism implies a general concern for others' welfare. The experimental evidence on trust suggests, however, that it involves altruism
only to a limited degree and only toward a limited circle of individuals. See, e.g., infra
Part II.D.2 (discussing the role of group identity in social dilemmas); Part II.E (discussing the role of personal cost in determining the incidence of cooperation in social dilemmas). Second, there is evidence that the phenomenon of trust may be related to
another, less-attractive form of other-regarding behavior-vengefulness. The existence
of vengefulness is supported not only by casual empiricism but also by experimental
studies of "ultimatum games" in which one player is asked to divide a monetary stake
(say, ten dollars), and the other player is asked either to accept or to reject the proposed division. If the division is rejected, both players get nothing. Rational selfishness predicts that the first player will offer the second only the minimum amount
needed to make accepting the division more profitable than rejecting it (say, one
penny). In real ultimatum games, however, the first player often chooses to offer the
second a substantial portion (sometimes half) of the total. More importantly, when
the first player tails to do this, the second will often reject the division, ensuring that
both get nothing. See generally Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatunis, Dictators, and Manners,J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1995, at 209, 209-19. Although
vengefulness may seem irrational at the individual level, it may be evolutionarily advantageous if it promotes group cohesiveness and cooperative behavior within the group.
Set, infra text accompanying notes 192-95 (discussing the evolutionary problem of excluding noncooperators from a cooperative group).
_i Although economists and legal scholars who write in the tradition of law
and
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is especially apparent in the corporate law literature, where the "law
and economics" approach has had a tremendous (some might say defining) influence. 2
Yet the neoclassical assumption that people are both rational and
selfish is just that-an assumption. For at least two reasons, we believe
that the homo economicus model may be potentially misleading when it
is applied to explain the relationship between corporate law and cooperative behavior within firms.
First, trust behavior is a fact. Casual empiricism reveals that people often behave in an other-regarding fashion, including behaving
both as if they trust and as if they are trustworthy." As we discuss in
greater detail in Part 11, this evidence from everyday life is amply sup-

ported by experimental findings that people conduct themselves in
ways that are difficult or impossible to explain unless they are capable

economics often give lip service to the idea that people can behave altruistically or irrationany, as a rule, they also presume that the best way to analyze and regulate human
behavior in commercial relationships is to start from the assumption of rational selfishness. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw 3-4, 74-75, 143-44,

464-65 (4th ed. 1992) (noting that "the happiness... of other people may be a part of
one's satisfactions," but going on to discuss altruism primarily in the contexts of family
relationships and charities); Williamson, supra note 16, at 482-83 (suggesting that trust
may be important in personal but not in business relationships).
See supra text accompanying notes 2, 12 (discussing the dominance
of the "nexus
of contracts" approach). Corporate scholars who discuss the role of trust in business
relationships tend to rely on notions of calculative trust driven by concerns about retaliation and reputation. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations,supra note
15, at 274 (discussing the role of social and familial relationships in closely held corporations); Mahoney, supra note 15, at 9 (describing trust in closely held corporations as
driven by "extralegal constraints" such as "the threat of social sanctions" and concern
for reputation); Rock, supra note 13, at 1013, 1104 (discussing the roles of social sanctions and reputation in motivating trustworthy behavior). Three notable exceptions
are Bruce Chapman, Tamar Frankel, and Lawrence Mitchell. All have written on the
importance of trust in business relationships, although they do not explore the underlying behavioral mechanism. Bruce Chapman, Trust, Economic Rationalit ,, and the Corporate Fiduciary Obligation,43 U. TORONTO L.J. 547 (1993) (arguing that a contractual
view of corporations is ineffectual without trust); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and
Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425 (1993) [hereinafter Mitchell, Fairness and
Trust] (arguing that courts and legislatures unwittingly have destroyed the fiduciary
fabric of corporate law by disregarding the role of trust); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust
and Team Production in Post-CapitalistSocieo, 24J. CORP. L. 869 (1999) (claiming that
where trust is lost, suspicion, self-protection, and diminished dedication will follow);
Tamar Frankel, Trusting and Non-Trusting: Comparing Benefits, Cost and Risk
(1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors),
available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafabstract_id=214588.
For example, people leave tips in restaurants while traveling, ask for and rely
on
directions from strangers in unfamiliar cities, and respond to disabled persons' requests for assistance negotiating street hazards.
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of internalized trust.-"'
Second, given that internalized trust exists, economic analysis itself predicts that it is likely to be an important and potent force in
business organizations. This is because trust offers distinct efficiency
advantages for both individuals and institutions, including but not
limited to the institution known as the corporation.
B.

The Efficiency of Trust

Social scientists have long argued that evolution can favor the development of a capacity for altruism in social organisms such as homo
sapiens. This is because "irrationally" cooperative behavior within a
particular group (including but not limited to trust and trustworthiness) often enhances the group's overall welfare. If the group does
well, members of the group on average also do well. Thus concern for
others-including concern for those who trust you-can be highly
adaptive in species that rely on social interaction and exchange."
For similar reasons, cooperative behavior can be an important factor in the evolution not just of social organisms but also of social institutions. This is because groups whose members cooperate with each
other can often thrive and grow at the expense of groups whose
members do not cooperate. Social institutions that can promote and
Set, infra text accompanying notes 54-61 (reviewing experimental evidence).
e.',' RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 4-5 (1976) (discussing whether
eg.,
altruism lowers or raises the survival prospects of an animal); ROBERT TRIVERs, SOCIAL
EVOLUT ION 44 (1985) (explaining that altruism is favored by kinship, reciprocity, and
parasitism); EDW\VRD 0. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEw SYNTHESIS 3-4 (1975) (citing kinship as the explanation for why altruism has evolved by natural selection); William D. Hamilton, The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior,7J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY
1, 1 (1964) (describing altruism in natural selection with a genetic-mathematical
model); Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of ReciprocalAltruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 35,
35 (1971) (showing how natural selection can operate against nonreciprocal behavior); ,alio infra note 67 (discussing evidence that capacity for trust and trustvorthines is -attractive to the opposite sex").
,, The problem (from an evolutionary perspective) is how cooperative individuals
can reap the benefits of their cooperation if others in the group choose to behave opportunistically. See Donald T. Campbell, On the Conflicts Between Biological and Social
Evolution and Between Psychology and Moral Tradition, 30 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1103, 111112 (1975) (describing this problem). For cooperation to have sunival value, cooperators must be able somehow to exclude noncooperators; otherwise, the noncooperators
can flourish at cooperators' expense. We discuss this problem in greater detail later in
the context of closely held corporations. See infra Part III.C (discussing nonlegal forces
that encourage trust within firms).
7 So' generally ELLIOTT SOBER & DAVID SLOAN
WILSON, UNTO OTHERS: THE
EvOLUTION AND PSYICHOLOGY OF UNSELFISH BEHAVIOR (1998) (discussing the evolu-

tionary advantages of altruism for groups, institutions, and cultures).
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support trust among their participants can, as a result, have an evolutionary advantage over institutions that cannot."
In this Article, we focus on one particular social institution in
which we believe the role of trust behavior is both fundamental and
largely neglected in the legal literature. That institution is the business corporation. Corporate production typically requires the combined efforts and contributions of a wide range of groups and individuals, including shareholders, employees, and managers. The nexus
of contracts theory of the firm holds that these efforts and contributions are coordinated primarily through a web of express and implied
contractual agreements. At the same time, however, it is widely recognized that complex joint production in a business firm raises at
least two types of contracting problems. The first and perhaps more
familiar problem is the agency cost problem. The second problem,
which has attracted recent scholarly attention, is the team production
problem.
Consider first the agency cost problem. In the typical agency relationship, one person (the principal) wants to pay another (the agent)
to perform some task that the principal is unable or unwilling to perform for herself. But hiring an agent to do something for you immediately raises the question: How can you make sure your agent does a
good job? Economic and legal scholars have devoted tremendous energy over the years to investigating how legal rules, formal contracts,
compensation systems, and market incentives can be used to motivate
agents to serve their principals' interests.39 Two fundamental points
n Taken to its logical conclusion, this analysis suggests that nation-states and societies that encourage trust are likely to flourish relative to those that do not. In this win.
there is an emerging literature in social and political science on the importance of "social capital" to economic development. See, e.g., FRANCES FUKAYAMA, TRUST: THE
SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 27 (1995); LUIGI GUISo El AL., THE

ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W7563, 2000); RAFAEL LA PORTA ET AL., TRUST INLtARGE
ORGANIZATIONS (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5864, 1996);
Paul S. Adler & Seok-Woo Kwon, Social Capital: The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly
(Sept. 28, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
See Blair & Stout, Team Production in Business Organizations,supra note 7, at 743
n.1 (citing literature). Agency problems are often viewed, at least in the legal literature, as the central problem of corporate governance. This argument grows out of a
model of the firm that views the corporation as a bundle of assets that belongs to its
shareholders. Hence shareholders, as ultimate "owners" of the firm (or in more sophisticated versions, the firm's sole "residual claimants"), are principals who hire officers and directors to serve as their agents. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL
R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 22-35 (1991); Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agen Oy Costs and
OwnershipStructure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305, 357 (1976); Roberta Romano, Theory of the Firm
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emerge from that effort. First, agency costs are an endemic problem
associated with doing business in the corporate form. (After all, corporations are fictional entities that must act, if at all, through human
agents.) Second, no combination of legal rules and market forces can
bring agency costs in firms dowrn to zero. Negotiating contracts,
monitoring agents, and enforcing legal rights in the courts are all
costly actixities, and, in any case, such efforts usually cannot eliminate
all opportunities for an agent to shirk or steal. This is true to a greater
or lesser extent for every agent employed by the firm, from the chairman of the board down to the janitor.
While agency cost analysis focuses on the problem of getting
agents to act in their principals' interests, complex economic production can also give rise to a second type of economic problem-the
team production problem.4 Team production occurs when two or
more indixiduals must each contribute valuable resources to produce
a single, nonseparable output. If these inputs are complex or difficult
to monitor, it may be impossible for team members to draft ex ante a
contract that specifies exactly who is to contribute what, in return for
what payment. But if the team members wait until the project is completed to divvy up the profits, how will they decide who is entitled to
what share, when all parties had to contribute to earn the profits in
the first place? Such contracting difficulties can discourage investment in team production, especially when invested resources become
"team-specific," so that team members cannot walk away4from the project without losing some of the value of their investment. '
and Capital Ma*ets, in FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 3, 3-62 (Roberta Romano
ed., 1993); ce'also Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of CorporateGovernance,
52J. FIN. 737 (1997) (stating that the central problem of corporate governance is the
agency problem).
We disagree Nith the notion that shareholders are or should be thought of as the
sdc residual claimants of publicly held corporations. Instead, we believe that it is
more accurate to think of "the firm" as composed of the interests of a number of
groups uith strong residual claims, including not only shareholders but also managers
and rank-and-file employees. See Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory, supra note 7.
Nevertheless, because the firm as a fictional entity must act through its agents, we
agiec that agency costs are an important problem in corporations.
grgen,iallv sources cited supra note 7.
S gowrally Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory, supra note 7, at 265-76 (discussing the team production contracting problem); see also CHARLES R. O'KELLEV, JR.
& ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CA5ES
\ND NATERIALs 7-9 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing team production in firms). As this description implies, market and legal sanctions provide only limited protection for investnent in team production. The very nature of team-specific investment ensures
that the market provides little protection, while complexity of inputs makes it difficult
to rely on legal constraints or contractual incentives.
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Corporate scholars generally recognize that team production, with
its attendant contracting problems, plays a central role in closely held
corporations in which a small number of individuals participate both
as investors in and managers of the firm. 42 We have recently argued
elsewhere that team production may also be important in publicly
held firms. a In particular, we argued that an essential economic function of the publicly held corporation may be to provide a vehicle
through which shareholders, executives, rank-and-file employees, and
others who invest team-specific resources can, for their own benefit,
protect and promote such investments by jointly relinquishing control
over those resources and their joint enterprise to a third party-a
board of directors-charged with representing the team's interests
and with allocating rewards among team members. Although this approach does much to explain the actual structure of corporate law," it
42 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 31, at 423 (describing the problem of
"bilateral monopoly" for closely held corporations); Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations,supra
note 15, at 273-75 (describing closely held corporations' problem of shareholder "conflicts of interest"); O'Kelley, supra note 15, at 218-30 (discussing the team production
problem in closely held firms); Talley, supra note 15, at 1002-05 (same).
43 See Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory, supra
note 7, at 276-89 (arguing that
team production analysis helps explain the rationale for hierarchical decisionmaking
structures within publicly held corporations as well as for directors' almost absolute
freedom from the direct control of shareholders, senior executives, or other potential
"stakeholders" in the firm); see also O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 41, at 7-9 (discussing team production as a basic economic problem found in firms).
44 A variety of features of corporate law have proven difficult
to reconcile with a
principal-agent model of firms that treats shareholders as "owners" of publicly held
corporations and corporate directors as shareholders' "agents." For example, a corporation's assets belong not to the shareholders but to the firm itself. Moreover, control
over these assets rests in the hands of the board of directors. While the members of
the board are nominally elected by the shareholders, once elected they are not subject
to direct shareholder control. As a matter of law, it is difficult for dissatisfied shareholders to remove them, and as a matter of practice it is often impossible. Meanwhile,
corporate officers (whom commentators often lump together with directors, somewhat
misleadingly, under the term "managers") fall into another legal category altogether.
They are employees, hired and fired by the board of directors and subject to the
board's direct control. See Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theoy. supra note 7, at 290315 (discussing directors' legal roles and shareholders' voting rights).
Despite such evidence of director autonomy, modem corporate scholars generally
seem to fall into two camps: those who believe that shareholders control directors
through such devices as incentive contracting and the market for corporate control
and those who believe that directors do what the firm's senior executives want them to
do. The discussion above suggests that neither of these two conflicting views is quite
accurate. Directors are neither shareholders' puppets nor pawns of the CEO. Rather,
they are "mediating hierarchs" who enjoy a substantial range of legal discretion to use
the firm's assets in ways that neither shareholders nor managers would necessarily
choose were they in charge. A major innovation of the team production approach is
that it provides a theoretical rationale for this independence.
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also raises the obvious question of why a board largely insulated from
the direct command and control of either shareholders or other corporate stakeholders should do a good job for either.
The bottom line is that, whether one focuses on agency costs or
team production problems, opportunistic behavior of one kind or another is an unavoidable problem associated with doing business in the
corporate form. Indeed, it is the paramount problem and the focus
of
46
the vast bulk of the modem literature on corporate law and policy.
Thus the stage is set for understanding the importance of trust.
Where trust can be harnessed, it can substantially reduce the inefficiencies associated with both agency and team production relationships. Trust permits transactions to go forward on the basis of a handshake rather than a complex formal contract; it reduces the need to
expend resources on constant monitoring of employees and business
partners; and it avoids the uncertainty and expense associated with
tiling to enforce formal and informal agreements in the courts. Trust
behaxior also reduces losses from others' undetectable or unpunishable opportunistic behavior, losses that could discourage the formation of valuable agency and team production relationships in the first
place.
Business organizations that promote trust in relationships among
investors, managers, and employees accordingly can reduce and, in
some cases, avoid many of the costs associated with policing against
opportunism-costs that other firms must bear. The corollary is that
firms that successfully encourage trust among their participants on
relevant tasks can enjoy an evolutionary advantage over firms that do

I- Thus while the institution of a corporate hierarchy topped by the board may
address one economic problem (team production), it may exacerbate another (agency
costs). Under the team production approach, directors are conceived not as shareholders' agents, but as agents for the entire corporate team. This team consists of all
Nho make firm-specific investments and expect a share of the resulting output, including not just shareholders but also managers, employees, and possibly other groups as
ucll. S' id. at 276-87 (explaining why team members would decide to incorporate,
knouing that doing so would result in a loss of influence over the corporation's future
and over the division of rents).
J, Much of the corporate law literature, not to mention the average corporate law
ca-sebook, focuses on how opportunistic behavior within the firm can be discouraged
through derivative suits, incentive compensation contracts, shareholder proposals,
shareholder and director voting rules, an active market for corporate takeovers, and so
forth. It nevertheless remains widely understood that each of the standard legal and
market mechanisms thought to constrain and direct behavior within the firm has its
own costs and limitations. As a result, external incentives cannot completely eliminate
the costs associated with opportunistic behavior within firms.
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not.47 Economic analysis itself suggests that a corporate capacity to
promote trust behavior may often be not just important to business
success but essential. 8
This is something that management theorists, consultants, and
businesspeople themselves have always known. There is an extensive
literature both in the popular and business press and in management
theory that stresses the importance of establishing, building, and supporting trust among corporate participants.' As the book jacket of
one recently published book in the trade press puts it: "Trust is the
glue that holds organizations together. More powerful than contracts
or authority, trust enables partner companies-or groups within a
company-to achieve results that exceed the sum of the parts."f ' Nevertheless, legal scholarship largely neglects the role of trust in firms,
assuming instead that the best-indeed, only--way of controlling opportunistic behavior is through legal and market incentives that discourage the shirking and stealing that is to be expected of rationally
selfish individuals.
Why is this so? As noted earlier, part of the reason may lie in the
fact that trust behavior in business firms often appears, on first inspection, to be consistent with (if not fully explained by) observed external
incentives, making it easy to jump to the conclusion that those incentives cause trusting and trustworthy behavior. 1 Law professors may be
47 Trust behavior is valuable in situations in which the best
outcome requires cooperative, coordinated efforts. In some situations, however, cooperation is unnecessary and the optimal outcome is more likely to be reached through individual efforts.
In such circumstances, it is better to encourage competitive rather than cooperative
behavior. Thus successful business firms likely encourage competition in some tasks
and cooperation in others. In this Article, we focus our attention on the second situation.
48See Mitchell, Fairness and Trust; supra note 32, at 425 ("[T]rust is essential
for

corporate survival.").

See Mishra, supra note 8, at 282 ("[R]ecent discussions by both scholars and the
business press suggest that trust is a central factor in organizational behavior and organizational survival for both public and private organizations.... Several scholars
have recently proposed that trust is a central factor enhancing organizations' longterm success and survival, especially because environments have become more uncertain and competitive."); see also Christel Lane, Introduction: Theories and Isue in the
Study of Trust, in TRUST WITHIN AND BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 8, at 1

("Trust... is increasingly being viewed as a precondition for superior performance
and competitive success in the new business environment."); Sue Shellenbarger, WoM*place Upheavals Seem To Be ErodingEmployees' Trust,WALL ST. J.,June 21, 2000, at BI (citing a study that found a correlation between workplace trust and profits); sources cited
supra note 8.
,oLEWIS, supra note 8.
1 See supratext accompanying note 9; see alsoJaneJ.Mansbridge, On the Relation
of
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particularly prone to this leap because legal education traditionally
emphasizes the case method, and case law inevitably focuses on situations in which trust has broken down and the parties are seeking to
invoke the weight of the law to control behavior.
But it seems likely that the contemporary dominance of the law
and economics approach to corporate law, with its implicit reliance on
the homo ecofomicus model of human behavior, has also worked to
blind corporate theorists to the importance of trust. Economic analysis has made a number of important contributions to the legal culture's understanding of corporate law, not the least of which has been
its emphasis on rigorous and exacting analysis. At the same time, the
resulting tendency to focus only on behavior that can be easily captured in formal mathematical models may have contributed to many
modern corporate theorists' reluctance to abandon the idea of rational selfishness in favor of such an apparently soft and "mushy" concept as trust.
We believe, however, that it is possible to develop a formal conception of trust that allows us (1) to understand when and how it
comes into play, (2) to identif , what factors and variables determine
its incidence, and (3) to make and test predictions about behavior.
To demonstrate, we review below an especially compelling and useful
form of evidence of when and why trust occurs-experimental studies
of human behavior in social dilemmas.
II. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON TRUST IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS

Social scientists use the term "social dilemma" to describe situations in which groups of individuals find themselves facing incentives
identical to those presented in the familiar prisoner's dilemma of
game theory. In a classic prisoner's dilemma, two players are asked to
choose between either "cooperating" with their partner or "defecting." Payoffs are structured so that, whatever her partner does, a
player can always receive a higher payoff by defecting than by cooperating. Yet if both players defect, they each receive less than if both
cooperated. In other words, although the best group outcome requires cooperation, the best strategy for each individual is always to
defect. The net result is that the pursuit of self-interest inexorably

SELF-INTEREST 133, 141 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed.,
1990) ("We seriously underestimate the frequency of altruism when, having designed
our lives to make self-interest and altruism coincide, we interpret such coincidences as
demonstrating the pervasiveness of self-interest rather than altruism.").

Alntim and Spf-Inerest, in BEYOND
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diminishes the players' mutual welfare. 2
Consider a common example of a social dilemma, the "group contribution game." A group of n players is assembled and each player
given a sum of money (say, $10) as an initial "stake." The players are
told that they can either keep the cash or contribute it to a common
investment pool. They are also told that any money contributed to
the common pool will be multiplied by some factor greater than 1 but
less than n and distributed equally among all the players in the group,
including those who chose not to contribute. Thus the best individual
strategy in the game is to keep the $10 (while taking a pro rata portion of anything that ends up in the common investment pool). The
best group outcome, however, requires universal contribution.
Social dilemma experiments offer important insights into trust.
This is because the structure of a social dilemma drives selfish players
always to defect. Trust, however, can provide a motivation for players
in a social dilemma to choose the optimal, cooperative outcome over
the individually rational but suboptimal solution. In other words,
trust can solve the dilemma.
Suppose four players trapped in a social dilemma each believe
that their fellow players are intrinsically trustworthy. In such a situation, the players could achieve the optimal outcome by choosing to
trust each other (to make themselves vulnerable by selecting a cooperative strategy, in the expectation that their fellows also will cooperate) and, in the same act, choosing to be trustworthy (to refrain from
exploiting their fellows' vulnerability, even though defecting would
produce a higher individual payoff). Although this may seem an obvious solution, it is important to emphasize that rational and purely
selfish players would never actually cooperate in this manner. Although they might agree to cooperate, defection remains the dominant strategy, and all would renege on their agreement.
Rational selfishness therefore precludes trust. Yet, over the past
forty years, social scientists have published the results of literally hundreds of experiments in which individuals were placed in situations in
which they faced payoff structures resembling those in the group contribution game." These experimental studies demonstrate beyond
For example, suppose that each player is told that she will receive $6 if she defects and her partner cooperates, $4 if both cooperate, $2 if both defect, or $0 if she
cooperates but her partner defects. In such a case, each player maximizes her indiidual returns by defecting. However, mutual defection produces a total payoff of only $4
($2 each). Mutual cooperation would produce a total payoff of $8 ($4 each).
52

53

See Robyn M. Dawes et al., Cooperationfor the Benefit of Us-Not Me, or My Con-
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question that trust exists. Homo sapiens in a social dilemma-unlike
homno economicus-shows a marked and predictable tendency toward
"irrationally" cooperative behavior in general and toward trust behavior in particular.
We explore below some of the factors and variables that have
proven empirically important in determining the incidence of trust in
social dilemma games. As will be seen, this evidence supports five
findings. First, trust is an empirical reality; individuals in social dilemma experiments exhibit far more cooperative behavior than can
possibly be explained by external incentives. Second, different individuals manifest different levels of willingness to cooperate in social
dilemma experiments. Third, these individual variations to some degree reflect differences in individuals' past experiences, suggesting
that trust may be a learned behavior. Fourth, trust is also a socially contingent behavior. In other words, trust appears to depend significantly
on individuals' perceptions of others' expectations, likely behaviors,
and social relationships to themselves; in some social situations people
predictably display trust, while in others they predictably do not. Finally, however, economic payoffs are not irrelevant. Although people
cooperate in social dilemmas even when they must incur a personal
cost, the levels of cooperation observed begin to decline as the cost of
cooperating increases.
Taken as a whole, the experimental evidence on human behavior
in social dilemmas consequently provides a portrait of humanity that
differs markedly from the picture painted by the homo economicus
model. In particular, people appear to shift readily between at least
two preference functions or modes of behavior, depending on the social context. Put differently, the typical individual manifests at least two
distinct personalities. One might be described as a "competitive" or
"self-regarding" personality. When the competitive personality is
dominant, an individual will choose options that maximize her persarne,in BEYON\D SELF-IN'EREST, supra note 51, at 97, 97-110 [hereinafter Dawes et al.,

Cooperation] (summarizing social dilemma studies); Dawes & Thaler, supra note 3
(same); Daxid Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of
Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALIY & Soc\' 58 (1995) (summarizing the results of over 100 studies done between 1958 and 1992); see also, e.g.,John M. Orbell et
al.,
Explaining Discussion-Induced Cooperation, 54 J. PERSONALIY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 811
(1988) (describing two social dilemma studies in which group discussion was shown to
enhance cooperation); Parks et al., supra note 16 (describing a social dilemma study);
Julian B. Rotter, Interpersonal Trust, Trustworthiness, and Gullibility, 35 AM.
PS'CHOLOGIST 1 (1980) (same); Toshio Yamagishi, The Structural Goal/Expectation The, f Cooperation in SocialDilemmas,in 3 ADVANCES INGROUP PROCESSES 51 (EdwardJ.
Lawler ed., 1986) (same).
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sonal payoffs without regard for effects on others, implying a preference function indifferent to others' welfare. The second self is a "cooperative" or "other-regarding" personality. When the cooperative
personality governs, an individual will choose options that maximize
group welfare over options that maximize her own individual welfare,
implying an other-regarding preference function. Social context,
tempered by considerations of personal cost, determines when the
cooperative personality emerges.
A.

The Reality of Thtst

As noted earlier, one reason why modern corporate scholarship
tends to overlook the role of trust in encouraging cooperative behavior may be that the cooperation we observe in firms is often consistent
both with internalized trust and with external incentives.5' One of the
most valuable attributes of social dilemma experiments is their ability
to untangle such external and internal motivations for cooperative
behavior. Similarly, one of the most important and intriguing findings of such experiments is that the incidence of cooperation in social
dilemma games is far higher than can possibly be explained by external incentives alone. Consider the case of the social dilemma game
played by strangers who never expect to see each other again and who
are told that the game will be played only once. Defection is the only
sensible strategy for the rationally selfish player in such a "one-shot"
game. Yet cooperation5 rates in one-shot social dilemma games ap5
proximate fifty percent.
Further evidence of the existence of trust emerges from comparing cooperation rates in one-shot games with cooperation rates in
games in which players are told that they will play repeatedly. If behavior that looks like "trust" is actually driven by the fear of retaliation
or loss of reputation-as most economists presume-then when cooperation occurs at all it should occur only in repeat-game situations
in which one player's cooperation can be rewarded by her partner's
future cooperation (and, conversely, defection punished by future defection) . The homo economicus model accordingly predicts that repeat
54 See supra text accompanying notes 9, 51.

5 That is, the average player typically contributes about 50% of her initial stake to
the common investment pool. See Dawes & Thaler, supra note 3, at 189 (noting that,
on average, subjects contribute between 40% and 60% of the socially optimal quantity
in single-play contribution games); Sally, supra note 53, at 62 (finding that the mean
cooperation rate for a sample of over 130 experiments averaged 47%).
There is reason to question whether the prospect of "tit-for-tat" really provides a
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games should have higher cooperation rates than one-shot games. Yet
the experimental studies show the opposite result; cooperation rates are
lower in reiterated play than in one-shot games.57 Later we will consider an explanation for this finding. For the moment, we simply note
that it is clearly inconsistent with the assumption that people behave
only in a calculative, self-interested way.
Perhaps the most thorough investigation of the ineffectiveness of
calculative selfishness in predicting cooperative behavior may be
found in an analysis of the accumulated results of thirty-five years of
social dilemma experiments prepared by David Sally.5' Sally developed a data set of 130 social dilemma experiments and categorized
each according to a variety of experimental variables (one-shot versus
repeated gaines, two-person versus multiperson games, and so forth).
He then performed a regression analysis that compared the cooperation rates observed in the different experiments with identified experimental variables. He found that the variables one would expect to
matter most for calculative trust (for example, reiterated games ought
to have higher cooperation rates than one-shot games, and reiterated
games with relatively small numbers of players ought to have higher
rates still) either had little effect on cooperation rates or effects opposite to those predicted by neoclassical theory.59
mteaningful incentive for cooperation in repeat games, especially when the games are
played by more than two people. In such situations it can be difficult for players to

identity the indiriduals who have defected. And even when this can be done, it is impi issible to "punish" the defector without also punishing others in the group who have
coiperated. Dawes & Thaler, supra note 3, at 191; see also Yamagishi, supra note 53, at
75 (noting that cooperation often continues in reiterated games even when penalizcd).

Cooperation is also hard to explain under the neoclassical model when the players
know that play will end after a certain number of rounds, ging rise to the "end-game"
scenario. Game theory predicts that in the known last round of play, both players
shuld detect because there is no prospect of cooperation being rewarded in the future. Knowing that defection is certain in the last trial, both players will also defect in
the penultimate trial, and so on by backward induction, until defection becomes the
dominant strategy for both players in all trials. See Dawes & Thaler, supra note 3, at
1911Sally, supra note 53, at 65.
S,,Davues & Thaler, supra note 3, at 188-89 (finding that single-trial games,
whkh accounted for about one-third of the sample, actually had higher cooperation
rates than repeated games).
S,,,Sally, u/ra note 53, at 58.
For example, the size of the experimental group appeared to have little influence on the incidence of cooperation, while (as noted above) cooperation rates actually wcre lower in reiterated games than one-shot plays. See id. at 77. The notable ex-

ception uas the size of the benefits from defection. In accord with neoclassical theory,
Subjects were more likely to defect when the monetary benefits from defection were
greatcr. See also infra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing how trust with large
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In contrast, cooperation rates seemed highly sensitive to variables
that should be irrelevant to the rationally selfish player. For example,
cooperation was far more likely when the experimenter instructed the
players to cooperate. This is inconsistent with rational selfishness, as
mere instructions do not change either the players' payoffs or the
dominance of defection as the optimal individual strategy.0 Similarly,
players were much more likely to cooperate in experiments in which
they were allowed to exchange promises to contribute. Again, this is a
striking result. Absent legal sanction or some threat of retaliation,
there is no reason in economic
theory why such promises should be
6
'
either believed or kept.
Social dilemma studies accordingly provide overwhelming evidence that a behavioral model of trust that relies solely on calculative
self-interest is likely to miss much if not most of the phenomenon it
attempts to describe. There is more-much more-going on here.
B.

Variationsin Individual Tendencies to Trust

To develop a better understanding of the cooperative behavior
observed in social dilemmas, it is worthwhile to explore a second consistent finding of such experiments: Different individuals playing a
social dilemma game appear to bring to 6the
table differing predisposi2
tions to trust and to behave trustworthily.
One notorious example of this phenomenon can be seen in experiments that have found that economics students are significantly
less likely than others to cooperate in social dilemma experiments.
One frequently cited study by Gerald Marwell and Ruth Ames, for example, found that cooperation rates in a social dilemma game generally averaged between forty percent and sixty percent. The notable
exception was the series of games played by economics graduate students. 3 In those games, the cooperation rate was only twenty perstakes can develop in repeated games in which parties start with small stakes).
60 See Sally, supra note 53,
at 78.
61 See id. As Thomas Hobbes famously put it, "Covenants, without the Sword, are
but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all." HOBBES, supra note 20, at 223.
62 SeeJames E. Alcock & Diana Mansell, Predispositionand Behavior
in a Collective Dilemma, 21 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 443 (1977) (discussing people's predisposition to cooperate or defect).
63 See Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames, Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?,
15 J.
PuB. ECON. 295, 306 (1981) (finding that economics graduate students are far less
likely to cooperate in social dilemma experiments than others are); see also Sally, supra
note 53, at 78 (reporting the results of meta-analysis of over 100 studies and concluding that psychology students are significantly more likely to cooperate than others are,

while economics students are less likely to cooperate, although not to a statistically sig-
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cent. '

This result illustrates a more widespread phenomenon-that individuals appear to differ significantly in their willingness to trust others.
Some people are "high trusters" who behave as if they generally expect others to behave trustworthily (for example, to tell the truth, refrain from stealing, keep their promises, and contribute to public
goods). Others are "low trusters" who expect people to behave opportunistically (for example, to lie, steal, break promises, and free-ride).
These differing expectations show up reliably in responses to questionnaires designed to measure trust, such as the Rotter Interpersonal
Trust Scale.'

Being a high truster is associated with a variety of personality
characteristics. One such characteristic is likability. Although as a
general rule people prefer others who are like themselves," trust is an
exception: Studies have found that both high and low trusters perceive high trusters as "happier, more ethical, and more attractive to
the opposite sex."f7 In other words, everyone likes a high truster.
Perhaps more importantly, trust in others is also closely correlated
with trustworthiness. High trusters not only expect others to cooperate; they are also far more likely to cooperate themselves.9 Conversely, individuals who score low on trusting others are themselves
more likely to lie, cheat, and steal. 6, They also are less likely to coopnificant degree); Yezer et al., supra note 10, at 177 (reporting evidence that economics
students are less likely to cooperate in experimental games).
See Manell & Ames, supra note 63, at 306.
Sel, 1.g., Peter Brann & Margaret Foddy, Trust and the Consumption of a Deteriorating ommon Resource, 31 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 615, 617 (1987) (using the Rotter Interpersonal Trust scale); see also, e.g., Parks et al., supra note 16, at 137 (using the
Yamagishi scale to separate high from low trusters). Social scientists have developed a
number of measures of individuals' willingness to trust others. See, e.g., Julian B. Rotter, A Aea Scalefor the Measurement of InterpersonalTrust, 35 J. PERSONALITY 651, 653
(1967); Toshio Yamagishi, The Provision of a Sanctioning System as A Public Good, 51 J.
PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCH. 110 (1986).
See Rotter, supranote 53, at 2.
Id. at 3. This observation is not only cause for woe among economics graduate
students; it also proxides empirical support for the claim that a capacity for trust offers
evolutionary advantages. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38 (discussing the evolutionary advantages of trust). Interestingly, low trusters, but not high trusters, also
perceived high trusters as having less common sense. See Rotter, supra note 53, at 3.
- See Rotter, supa note 53, at 2; see also, e.g., Robyn M. Dawes et al., Behavior,
Communication, and Assumptions About Other People's Behavior in a Commons Dilemma Situation,
35J. PERSONALITy & Soc. PSYCH. 1, 7 (1977) [hereinafter Dawes et al., Behavior, Communication] (finding that individuals who chose to defect in social dilemmas were four
times more likely to predict that their fellow players also would defect).
See Rotter, supra note 53, at 2.
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erate in social dilemmas. 7' This pattern is often explained as one of
projection. People who are untrustworthy expect others to be like
themselves (that is, untrustworthy) and behave accordingly. Similarly,
people who are trustworthy
assume others also are trustworthy and,
71
therefore, safe to trust.
C. Trust as a Learned Behavior
The notion that some people are more likely than others to display trust and trustworthiness naturally raises the question: What
causes these differences? It is possible that differences in trust behavior may be to some extent inherited. This would suggest, for example,
that economics students tend to defect in social dilemmas because low
trusters for some reason are attracted to the study of economics. A
second possibility, however, is that economics students score low on
trust in social dilemmas because studying economics teaches them to
be distrustful.72 There is substantial evidence to suggest that individ70 See, e.g., Brann & Foddy, supra note 65, at 622-23 (finding that individuals who

score highly on trust on the Rotter scale were more likely to exercise restraint in consuming a rapidly deteriorating common resource);John M. Orbell et a., Do Cooperators
Exit More Readily than Defectors?, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 147, 159 (1984) [hereinafter Orbell et al., Do CooperatorsExit?] (finding that individuals who expected others to cooperate were themselves more likely to participate and cooperate in a social dilemma);
Parks et al., supra note 16, at 142 (finding that sixty-one percent of high trusters opted
for cooperation in social dilemma, while only sixteen percent of low trusters did so).
71 Michael W. Macy &John Skvoretz, The Evolution of Trust and Cooperation
Between
Strangers: A Computational Model 63 AM. Soc. REV. 638, 640 (1998); John Orbell &
Robyn M. Dawes, A "Cognitive Miser" Theory of Cooperators'Advantage, 85 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 515, 517 (1991); see also Dawes et al., Behavior, Communication,supra note 68, at 7;
Orbell et al., Do CooperatorsExit?, supra note 70, at 147.
The causal connection between trustworthiness and trust is unclear. Someone who
is initially untrustworthy may simply assume that others are like herself. Alternatively,
someone who initially concludes that others are untrustworthy may thereafter feel that
there is less reason to be trustworthy herself. See Brann & Foddy, supra note 65, at 617;
Rotter, supra note 53, at 3; see also infra text accompanying notes 92-97 (discussing how
expectations regarding others' likely behavior are important determinants of willingness to trust in a particular situation).
72 See Robert H. Frank et al., Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation
?,J. ECON.
PERSP., Summer 1993, at 159 (arguing that "exposure to the self-interest model commonly used in economics alters the extent to which people behave in self-interested
ways"). This possibility is consistent with the extensive evidence available on the importance of social framing to trust. See infra Part II.D.
The authors would like to note that we find both possibilities distressing. One of
us holds a Ph.D. in economics and the other has co-authored a casebook in law and
economics. DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, LAW AND ECONOMIcs:

CGSES AND

MATERtA-S (1992). We take heart, however, from an experiment suggesting that while
economics students may be less inclined to cooperate in a formal social dilemma
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ual differences in willingness to trust in new situations are significantly
determined by differences in past experience, both recent and distant.
In other words, trust seems in large part a learned behavior.
Let us return to the empirical finding that players in repeat social
dilemmas tend to cooperate less than players in one-shot games. This
result (which is, as noted earlier, inconsistent with the assumption of
rational self-interest) appears driven by the following peculiar pattern: Players' willingness to trust and be trustworthy in repeated social
dilemma games deteriorates over time.7' This pattern can be explained as a result of players' initial trust in the other players' likely
cooperation being steadily eroded by experience. As cooperators
learn that other players are defecting, they become increasingly willing to defect themselves.
If individuals' willingness to trust others and to behave trustworthily toward them can be influenced by such relatively recent experiences,- it seems plausible that it can also be influenced by the weight
of accumulated past experiences. In accord with this view, psychologists and sociologists posit that trust is a generalized expectancy or belief about others' behavior formed on the basis of accumulated experience.'' When faced with a new situation, an individual choosing
game, they may be more inclined to cooperate in "real world" situations. See Yezer et
al., u/ra note 10, at 181 (reporting that students in economics classes were significantly more likely to seal and mail a "lost" letter enclosing currency apparently intended to repay a loan); see also infra note 77 (discussing why even economics students
inclined touard trust in everyday life might be less likely to cooperate in the context of
a formal experiment).
Sa, supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
See Dawes & Thaler, supra note 3, at 189; Sally, supra note 53, at 65; see also id. at
77-78 (finding that increasing the number of trials from 1 to 100 diminishes the average cooperation rate by 13 to 15 percentage points).
" Studies have also found that cooperation rates in a social dilemma can be significantly influenced by asking the players, immediately before playing the game, to
participate in some other cognitive task. Players who engage in a task that requires
cooperation are then more likely to cooperate in the dilemma. Conversely, players
assigned a competitive task are more likely to defect subsequently. See Samuel Bowles,
Endigentwus Prifirences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institution, 36J. ECON. LIT. 75, 99 (1998) (citing public goods experiments that show that
trust depends in part on whether the most recent cognitive task required competitive
or cooperative behavior).
Set,, e.g., Rotter, supra note 53, at 1 (describing this view and citing research that
"Suggests that modeling and direct teaching are the most potent forces in developing
high- or low-trusting beliefs in children"); see also TOM R. TLER, WVY PEOPLE OBEY

L\W 170-78 (1990) (arguing that most people obey the law because they feel that
they ought to and that this belief is in part a product of socialization); supra note 72
and accompanying text (describing the argument that studying economics makes people more distrusting).
THiE
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whether or not to trust will be influenced not only by the likely economic payoffs in the immediate circumstances but also by her past
experiences. If trust has proven adaptive for her in the past, she is
likely to opt for trust again in the present-even if a cold calculation
of payoffs would favor defection.
D. The Influence of Social Context
It is important to note that the claim that trust is a learned behavior does not imply that high trusters always favor cooperation over
competition in new situations. To the contrary, a fourth key empirical
finding from the social dilemma studies is that even high trusters, in
the right circumstances, predictably choose to defect rather than cooperate. The key appears to be whether, when faced with a new situation that presents social dilemma payoffs, an individual categorizes it
as a competitive task or a cooperative task. If the task is viewed as competitive, both high and low trusters pursue self-interest and defect. If
the task is categorized as cooperative, high trusters in particular will
choose a cooperative strategy that appears to reflect concern for others' welfare.77
What determines whether a social dilemma situation is perceived
as cooperative or competitive? One critical variable appears to be social context-players' perceptions of what others expect and need, how
others are likely to behave, and what others' relationships are to themselves. The importance of social context can perhaps be seen most
clearly from David Sally's comprehensive survey of the results of more
than one hundred social dilemma experiments. Sally found that cooperation rates in these studies ranged from as low as five to more
than ninety-five percent. 7s (This is an astounding degree of range,
given that all the experiments presented situations in which defection

77 This observation raises questions about labeling individuals as high or low trust-

ers. True, there may be some individuals who have only one preference function (that
of homo economicus) and always choose defection over cooperation in a social dilemma.
For most, however, the decision to cooperate or defect-that is, to opt for a purely selfinterested preference function or an other-regarding preference function-seem determined at least in part by whether past experience leads us to categorize the present
situation as cooperative or competitive. Thus, economics graduate students may cooperate less in social dilemmas, not because they are less cooperative, but because the
process of studying economics and game theory under assumptions of selfish rationality leads them to recognize the payoff structure of a social dilemma and categorize it
mentally as a competition game rather than a cooperation game. See supra text accompanying note 72.
7 Sally, supra note 53, at 62, 71.
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was the 0nly dominant strategy for the rationally selfish player.) Further, Sally concluded that a variety of purely social factors appeared
highly influential in determining the degree of cooperation observed
in social dilemma games. For example, players were more likely to
cooperate when they believed that their contribution was important to
the group's welfare: As the size of the loss to the group from an individual's defection increased, the likelihood of defection decreased.9
(An interesting implication is that the more vulnerable one becomes,
the greater the likelihood that a trusted person will in fact prove
trustworthy."') Nisual contact was another variable that significantly
increased cooperation rates, even though allowing players to view
each other does not change the payoffs in a social dilemma. 8'
These types of social variables-perceptions of others' dependence and personal contacts-are the sorts of variables that business
institutions can and do take account of and even deliberately manipulate. It is not unusual to find employers telling employees how valuable their contributions are or organizing meetings and social events
to give them opportunities to interact. In this Article, however, we
rish to draw attention to how the behavioral phenomenon of trust
can change our understanding not only of the nature and functioning
of corporations, but also of the nature and functioning of corporate
law. In this vein, we explore in greater detail below three particular
social variables that the empirical studies suggest strongly influence
trust behavior. These are: (1) instructions from authority, (2) perceptions of group membership, and (3) expectations regarding others' trust behavior.
1. Instructions from Authority
One of the most consistent findings in the social dilemma literature is that players are far more likely to cooperate with each other if
the experimenter simply asks them to do so. Sally's survey, for exam;"Id. at 79; s,,David Good, Individuals,InterpersonalRelations, and Trust, in TRUST:
31, 44 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988)
(noting that incidence of trust is influenced by the perceived importance of one's contribution to others, even though it is hard to see how this affects economic payoffs); see
also Bowles, supra note 75, at 94-95 (suggesting that contractual incompleteness, which
implies vulnerability, leads to trusting behavior).
Defection becomes more likely, however, when the personal economic payoff
from defection increases. Sally, supra note 53, at 75. Thus, increasing vulnerability can
only reliably promote trustworthy behavior when it does not also increase the potential
gain from defecting.
'AId. at 67, 83.
AUUKING AND BRE.WNG COOPERATrVE RELATIONS
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ple, found that explicit instructions to cooperate in a social dilemma
raised base cooperation rates by as much as forty percentage points.
Correspondingly, formal instructions to compete decreased cooperation rates by as much as thirty-three percentage points.b2
This result is unlikely to surprise either a psychologist or the average person on the street. It might, however, bewilder an economist;
whether the experimenter tells the players to cooperate or defect has
no effect on the economic payoffs in the game. Nevertheless, formal
instructions exert a strong influence on the likelihood of cooperation.
People seem inclined to do what they are told to do, especially when
instructions come from someone who is perceived as something of an
authority.
This effect is so strong that significant changes in behavior occur
when the experimenter even hints at her desires. For example, in one
social dilemma study by Lee Ross and Andrew Ward, players were divided into two groups. The first group was told that they were going
to play "The Community Game." The second group was told that they
were going to play "The Wall Street Game." Although both groups
were presented with identical payoff structures, the different labels
produced dramatic differences in behavior. Only about one-third of
the players chose to cooperate in playing "The Wall Street Game." In
contrast, more than two-thirds cooperated when playing "The Community Game. " 83
2.

Perceptions of Group Identity

A second social variable that consistently has been found to exert
a strong influence on cooperation rates in social dilemmas is group
identity. Social scientists have long argued that group identity is an
important component of most individuals' psychological makeup and
that in situations in which group identity is brought into play, individuals appear to adopt preference functions that consider the
82 Id. at

78.
" Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naive Realism in Eveyday Life: Inplicationsfor Social
Conflict and Misunderstanding,in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103, 106-07 (Edward S. Reed
et al. eds., 1996). Similarly, in some social dilemma trials, the experimenters used the

relatively value-aden words "give" or "cooperate" to describe the cooperative strategy.
In others, experimenters used neutral phrases (such as "project X"and "project I') to
describe cooperating and defecting strategies. Cooperation is significantly more likely
in the former sorts of games than in the latter. See Sally, supra note 53, at 65; see also
Bowles, supra note 75, at 88-89 (reviewing experimental studies that show cooperation
is more likely when the experimenter bids the subjects to "divide $10" than when the
decision is called an "exchange").
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group's welfare as well as their own. 8 This argument is amply supported by the social dilemma evidence. Players who perceive their fellow players as members of their own "ingroup" are more likely to cooperate than individuals who see themselves as playing against
members of an "outgroup. ' ' 5
Evidence of the importance of group identity can be seen in the
consistent finding that allowing the players to communicate with each
other in a social dilemma significantly increases the incidence of cooperation."" Sally's meta-analysis, for example, found that allowing
comnmnication raised base cooperation rates in repeated games by
torty percentage points. Social scientists have offered a variety of
reasons for why communication encourages cooperation. One possibility is that communicating promotes feelings of group identity.' s
A test of this hypothesis can be found in a series of social dilemma
experiments designed by Robyn Dawes, Alphons van de Kragt, and
John Orbell."' Groups of fourteen subjects, each of whom had been
given an initial monetary stake, were then randomly divided into two
subgroups of seven. Half of the subgroups were then told that if they
gave away their money, twice that amount would be distributed to the
other members of their subgroup (their ingroup). The other half
were told that if they gave away their money, twice that amount would
be distributed among the members of the other subgroup (their outgroup). Players who did not communicate with each other seemed
almost equally willing to contribute to their outgroup as to their in&e, e.g., Henri Tajfel, Social Identity and IntergroupBehavior, 13
Soc. SCI. INFO. 65,
68-70 (1974). See generally SOCL GROUPS AND IDENTITIES: DEVELOPING THE LEGACY
OF HENRI TAJFEL (W. Peter Robinson ed., 1996).
" Sally, suna note 53, at 68; see also Dawes et al, Cooperation,
supra note 53, at 99
("[E]xperiments have led us to conclude that cooperation rates can be radically affected by...
. group identity."); Kramer, supra note 24, at 588 (describing experiments
in which arbitrarily categorizing individuals into groups "often resulted in indiduals'
cialuating outgroup members as less... trustworthy").
&, Robyn M. Dawes, Social Dilemmas, 31 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 169, 185 (1980)
(citing studies and noting that "the salutary effects of communication on cooperation
are ubiquitous"); Komorita et al., Reciprocity and Induction, supra note 21, at 608 (citing
studies and noting that "communication between group members seems to produce
high contribution rates").
Sally, supra note 53, at 78.
Si, e.g., Kelly S. Bouas & S.S. Komorita, Group Discussion and Cooperation in Social
Dimma, 22 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1144, 1144 (1996) (discussing this hypothesis);
Dawes et a., Behavior, Communication, supra note 68, at 3 (same).
I Orbell et al.,
supra note 53, at 811-18. For more discussion of the nexus between
group discussion and cooperation, see Dawes et al., Cooperation, supra note 53, at 103-

(it.
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group (an average thirty-four percent versus thirty-three percent cooperation rate). Only ten minutes of communication, however, increased the cooperation rate (up to nearly seventy percent) among
players who had been told that their contribution would benefit their
ingroup. In contrast, communication slightly decreased cooperation
(down to thirty-one percent) among players who had been told that
their contribution would benefit their outgroup, although this effect
was not statistically significant."
Such results demonstrate both that a sense of group identity can
easily be fostered and that it can be extremely important to the decision to categorize a particular social relationship as either cooperative
or competitive. Although significant cooperation can occur without
overt efforts to create a group identity, enhancing feelings of group
identity predictably leads to increases in the levels of observed cooperation."' People are more willing to sacrifice self-interest for "us"
than for "them."
3.

Expectations About Others' Behavior

Finally, a third social variable that appears to influence individuals' willingness to exhibit trust behavior is their perceptions of
whether others are likely to exhibit trust. Studies have found that
players are much more likely to cooperate in a social dilemma when
they expect their fellow players to cooperate.' Similar evidence may
be observed in the consistent finding that players are more likely to
cooperate with each other when they are allowed a short time period
in which to communicate with each other. But they are particularly
likely to cooperate when their communication takes the form of exchanged statements of intent to cooperate.
90See Dawes et al., Cooperation, supranote 53, at 106.
91 See Sally, supra note 53, at 79.
92 See Scott T. Allison & Norbert L. Kerr, Group CorrespondenceBiases and the Prov'ision of Public Goods, 66J. PERSONALT' & SOC. PSYCHOL. 688, 688 (1994) ("Numerous
studies have reported that individuals are more likely to cooperate when the), expect

other group members to cooperate than when they expect others to defect."); Dawes,

supra note 86, at 187-88 (describing studies finding that cooperation rates are positively
correlated with expectations that other players will cooperate); Yamagishi, supra note
53, at 64 (discussing experimental findings that "[e]xpectations about other members'
behavior is one of the most important individual factors affecting members' decisions
Reciprocity and Induction, supra note 21, at
in social dilemmas"); see also Komorita et al.,
608 ("[I] ndividuals are more cooperative when they expect others to be cooperative.").
It should be noted that a high probability that others will cooperate makes defecting even more attractive to the rationally selfish player.
93 See, e.g., Dawes et al., Behavior, Communication, supra note 68, at 1, 5-7 (finding
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XW1hy does the expectation that others will cooperate increase the
incidence of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas? One possibility
is that the belief that others will cooperate increases perceptions of
ingroup membership.94 A second theory is that players in a social dilemma are motivated much less by the hope that they might extract
gains at their fellow players' expense than by the fear that their fellows
might successfully exploit them. In other words, people want to avoid
"being a sucker."" Yet a third possibility is that players look to others'
behaior as a signal in a novel and otherwise ambiguous social situation of what the appropriate norm of conduct is, and whether the
context calls for primarily cooperative or competitive behaior."
Whatever the cause of herd behavior in social dilemmas, players in
these games show a marked tendency to conform to the expected behaNior of other players. ' i Arhen in Rome, most do as they expect the
Romans to do.
E. The Influence of Economic Context
In emphasizing the starring role social factors play in determining
the incidence of trust, we do not mean to imply that economic factors
are unimportant. Homo sapiens is a far more other-regarding species
than homo economicus. But there is reason to believe that most people
keep at least one eye on personal payoffs when deciding whether to
that allowing subjects to exchange statements of intent to cooperate raised cooperation rates significantly compared to allowing subjects to communicate on irrelevant

.ubjects).
Se; e.g., Dawes & Thaler, supra note 3, at 195 (discussing this possibility).
Dawes, supra note 86, at 187. A belief that others will cooperate increases the
expected return from defecting but also decreases the expected losses from cooperating. If the second matters more to people than the first, expecting others to cooperate
uill increase one's own willingness to cooperate.
&v Bouas & Komorita, supra note 88, at 1144 (discussing a "perceived consensus"
Se
theory' of cooperation). See generally Cristina Bicchieri, Norms of Cocperation,100 ETHICS
838, 839 (1990) (discussing social norms as the tendency to replicate others' behavA Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of
ior); Robert B. Cialdini et al.,
Ntrnn-% To Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL 1015
(1990) (same).
7 Interestingly, in experiments in which players in multiple groups communicate,
different groups often develop and then follow different norms (for example, "conSee CRISTINA
tribute a portion of your stake" versus "contribute everything").
BICCHIERI,THE GRLMNINR OF SOCIETY (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript ch.5 at 18, 26,
on file with authors). A related phenomenon may be the "carryover" effect observed
in some social dilemma studies. When players in one group are allowed to exchange
commitments to cooperate but are then told that their contributions will go to players
in a second group, average cooperation rates remain higher than when players are not
allowed to communicate their intent and benefits remain within the group. Id. at 6.
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trust or be trustworthy.
Studies have found that, while people do cooperate in social dilemma games, as the personal cost associated with cooperating rises
(that is, as players' expected gains from defection increase), cooperation rates begin to decline. For example, Sally's regression analysis
found that doubling the reward from defecting decreased average cooperation rates by as much as sixteen percentage points." In other
words, people's willingness to trust appears to be mildly "downwardsloping." As the personal cost of trust in a social dilemma rises, cooperation rates decline. This observation raises the question: If trust
behavior is only likely to occur when it is not too costly to behave
trustworthily, how can trust be a source of significant social gains?
The answer to this question is twofold. First, the costs and benefits of trust behavior do not march in lockstep. Acts of trust that require only a modest sacrifice on the part of the trusted actor can produce much larger gains for the trusting actor. For example, a
marginal increase in the degree of care exercised by a corporate director or employee may greatly benefit a firm if it prevents the loss or
destruction of valuable corporate assets. Similarly, it is easy to imagine
situations in which an agent who steals from a firm (say, by selling a
trade secret) inflicts harm far greater than any benefit she receives.
The experimental evidence indicates that it is in exactly these sorts of
circumstances-when the individual cost of cooperation is relatively
small and the benefits for others relatively large-that people are most
likely to cooperate in a social dilemma. 9 Thus, trust behavior seems
particularly likely to occur (and to lead to clear social gains) in situations in which a corporate participant's trustworthy behavior would
create disproportionate gain or in which that participant's malfeasance would inflict disproportionate harm.
Second, studies have shown that while players in one-shot social
dilemmas are less likely to cooperate when playing for large stakes
(that is, when personal gains from defecting are large), players in repeated games can be induced to trust each other in such situations.
This is done by starting with small stakes and increasing the stakes in
later rounds.' °° In experiments of this sort, groups of players who cooperate with each other in initial rounds tend to continue cooperat98 Sally, supra note 53, at 75.
q9 See id. (finding that increasing players' costs of cooperation decreased cooperation rates in social dilemmas); id. at 79 (finding that as the gains to others in the group
from cooperation increase, cooperation rates increase).
100See Good, supra note 79, at 44 (discussing the small increment effect).
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ing in later rounds, suggesting that people view others' past cooperation as evidence of intrinsically trustworthy characters, increasing their
own Nillingness to trust."" This sort of pattern of repeated interaction
and increasing mutual vulnerability is often observed in the business
world. '"
The net result is that, even if the "supply function" for trust is
downward-sloping, there is probably a wvide variety of business circumstances in which trust behavior produces significant benefits. And
even small acts of trust, when aggregated over many players and many
transactions, can add up to very big gains. But the experimental evidence cautions against asking trust to bear too much weight in any individual case. When the price of honor gets too high, people refuse
to pay for it.
F. Caveats and Conclusions
Economists and legal scholars who favor economic analysis traditionally view human behavior in terms of a simple model of rational
selfishness constrained only by legal and market forces. Although this
model has great explanatory power in many situations, it overlooks a
third, less well understood but equally potent force for modifying
human behavior: socially contingent other-regarding preferences, including, but not limited to, trust."" Extensive experimental evidence
demonstrates that most people behave as if they have two personalities
or preference functions. In some contexts, individuals behave as if
the), were purely selfish. But when the social and economic conditions are right, their cooperative, other-regarding personalities
See', Thomas Gautschi, History Effects in Social Dilemma Situations, 12 RATIONALrIy
& SoC'y 131 (2000) (finding that subjects' past experience with other subjects in social
dilemmas affects their present decisions whether to cooperate or not).

For example, labor theorists frequently model the relationship between a firm
and its employees as one in which the employee displays trust by making incremental
investments in firm-specific human capital. See Edward B. Rock & michael L. Wachter,
The Enorceabilityof Norms and the Employ ment Relationship,144 U. PA. L. REv. 1913, 192124 (1996) (discussing this model); see alsoLEWIs, supra note 8, at 57-59 (observing from
case studies that companies in joint ventures can promote trust by collaborating on

smaller projects before moving to larger ones).
0,i Although our analysis focuses on trust, other-regarding preferences can produce other forms of behavior as well. Altruism can lead one person to look out for another's interests even in situations in which the beneficiary has not made any conscious
decision to make herself vulnerable. See Yezer et al., supra note 10 (describing "lost
letter experiments). Other-regarding preferences may also have a dark side in the
form of vengefulness, where one individual incurs a personal cost in order to punish
another. See supra note 30 (discussing vengefulness).
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emerge.
This last point bears emphasizing, for it hints at the potential fragility of trust. As noted earlier, one of the critical determinants of cooperative behavior in social dilemma games is what the players expect
the other players in the game to do. As a result, repeated social dilemma games tend to converge quickly on one of two possible equilibrium outcomes: Either most players cooperate, or most defect. The
natural implication is that even a small change in initial conditionsperhaps a change in the proportion of low- to high-trusters in a social
dilemma situation, in feelings of group identity, or even in the language used to describe a particular social or legal relationship-can
shift the situation past a "tipping point," moving the end result from
one behavioral extreme to the other.
The potential fragility of trust is heightened by the possibility that
the social conditions that favor trust are easier to destroy than to create. Express and implied signals of trust and trustworthiness are subject to being disproved by contrary evidence-say, when a player in a
social dilemma game tricks her fellow players into cooperating by announcing her own intent to cooperate and then exploits their trust by
defecting. In contrast, signs of lack of trust and trustworthiness tend
to be self-fulfilling. Once players in a social dilemma game come to
believe that their fellows intend to defect, they themselves defect, and
distrust prevails even if it was initially unjustified. In other words, the
impact of social signals, including choice of rhetoric, may be asymmetric. Rhetoric alone cannot support trust, but rhetoric alone can
undermine it.""
In sum, there is reason to believe that trust can only blossom in favorable social conditions. Moreover, even when people initially trust,
if their cooperation is not reciprocated-if other players choose instead to defect-they will quickly switch to a competitive strategy.
Trust, it turns out, is neither gullibility nor pure selflessness. When
abused, trust tends to disappear. But when it is not abused, trust permits patterns of reciprocal, other-regarding behavior to spring up that
are impossible to explain under neoclassical assumptions of selfish rationality. Moreover, as social dilemma experiments illustrate, this be104

See Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust?, in TRUST:

MAKING AND BREAKING

COOPERATIVE RELATIONS, supra note 79, at 213, 233-34 ("[T] rust itself affects the evidence we are looking for. While it is never difficult to find evidence of untrustworthy
behaviour, it is virtually impossible to prove its positive mirror image ....
[Distrust]
has the capacity to be self-fulfilling." (emphasis omitted)); Kramer, supra note 24, at
594 (noting that in asymmetric-experience situations "distrust is very difficult to invali-

date through experience").

2001]

BEHA IORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORA TE LA W

1777

havior allows individuals in groups to achieve outcomes that are far
superior-on both a group and an individual basis-to the outcomes
that can be achieved through rational selfishness. Although trust may
not be strictly "rational," it can be efficient. That observation in turn
suggests that, in many situations, the most effective way to constrain
welfare-reducing, opportunistic behavior may not be by changing individuals' external rewards and punishments, but instead by changing
their internal preferences and encouraging the emergence of their cooperative, other-regarding "personality."
The notion of endogenous preferences that can be changed by
manipulating social context provides a dramatic departure from standard economic analysis.' 0 ' But it can also provide significant insight
into actual human institutions. To illustrate, we consider in Part III
how several important and otherwise puzzling features of corporate
law can be explained through an analysis that takes account of trust
and the way actual people behave in actual situations. Before applying the lessons of social dilemma experiments to our understanding
of corporate law, however, we note the potential pitfalls of relying on
such experiments to predict human behavior in the far more complex
environment of the corporation.
Social dilemma games are, by their very nature, poor imitations of
the complexities of life in the everyday business world." 6 Yet, the information provided by such experiments is only useful if we are willing
to take the next step and assume that the sorts of variables that determine cooperation rates in experiments also influence cooperation between and among corporate officers, employees, directors, and shareholders. In doing this we inevitably run the risks associated with
extrapolation.
V, On first inspection, the notion of endogeneous preferences appears to pose a
challenge to economic analysis by raising the following question: If efficiency lies in
satisfying as many human desires as possible but if human desires change in response
to social circumstances, how are we to know what is "efficient?" A complete answer to
this question lies beyond the scope of this Article. For an excellent discussion, see
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Principles of Fairness Versus Human Welfare: On the
Evaluation of Legal Policy, 114 HARV. L. REv. (forthcoming 2001). We note, however,

that while in many cases there are no obvious efficiency advantages to be derived from
changing people's preferences (for example, from vanilla to strawberry ice cream), in
other cases there are. For example, we improve social welfare if we induce individuals
with sadistic preferences to adopt instead altruistic preferences. (Because sadists are
satisfied by inflicting pain on others while altruists are satisfied by increasing others'
happiness, shifting from sadism to altruism increases overall human happiness, other

things being equal).
, See Dawes, supra note 86, at 188 (observing that social dilemma games "are lousy
simulationsof the social dilemmas with which most of us are concerned").

1778

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW

[Vol. 149:1735

Some of these risks likely are not too serious. For example, because the participants in social dilemma experiments are often undergraduate and graduate students, it might be argued that their behavior is not representative of other segments of the population.
However, we suspect that it is representative enough of behavior in
most corporations. 1 7 After all, it is undergraduate and graduate students who often go on to inhabit the offices and cubicles of corporate
America.
Similarly, we do not think that it is critical that players in social dilemma games usually believe that they are playing with other individuals. (This belief is not always accurate; in some social dilemma
experiments, human players who were told that they were playing with
other humans were in fact playing against an algorithm or computer
program. 0 8) Many acts of trust in firms involve individuals dealing directly with other individuals, as when employees are asked to trust
their co-workers and immediate supervisors."" Moreover, there is reason to believe that people indulge in trust behavior not only with
other persons, but also with nonhuman entities, including institutions
like "the company." Individuals who are asked to play a social dilemma game with a computer and to interact with a workstation, for
example, display behavior similar to individuals who play with human
partners." 0
107See also Alvin E. Roth et al., Bargainingand Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubliana.
Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study, 81 A.M. EcON. REv. 1068, 1068-69 (1991)
(finding no significant differences in experimental behavior in ultimatum games
among subjects drawn from four different nations); supra note 30 (describing ultimatum games).
1WSara Kiesler et al., A Prisoner'sDilemma Experiment on Cooperation with People and
Human-Like Computers, 70J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 47, 48 (1996) (discussing
the practice in social dilemma games of the experimenter or a computer acting as a
fictional other player).
109 These personal interactions often extend throughout the firm in a "linking
pin"
system in which members ofworkgroups know and trust each other and their immediate supervisors; supervisors know and trust their workers, their fellow supervisors, and
their department head; and so forth up to the CEO and board of directors. Thomas
H.Jerdee & Benson Rosen, Effects of Opportunity To Communicate and isibility of Individual Decisions on Behavior in the Common Interest, 59J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 712, 716 (1974)
(describing the "linking pin" concept in which small groups in firms make commitments of cooperation to leaders who convey this to the next level of the organization).
1o Kiesler et al., supra note 108, at 55-60 (reporting the results of prisoner's dilemma games played with another human subject, with a computer workstation, and
with a computer that responded with synthesized speech and presented a picture of a
human face on the monitor and finding that people cooperate, albeit to a lesser degree, with computers). Casual empiricism also suggests that people often respond to
institutional entities as if they were human.
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Other limitations of social dilemma games may be more serious,
however. In particular, social dilemma experiments only test what
might be called "two-way" trust: players must choose to be either simultaneously trusting and trustworthy or simultaneously distrusting
and untrustworthy. Yet in many business situations one participant is
asked simply to trust, and the other simply to be trustworthy. There
may be some risk in assuming that the same variables that influence
two-way trust necessarily apply to "one-way" trust as well."'
More broadly, our approach to the social dilemma evidence is for
the most part a crude, behaviorist one. We treat individuals as black
boxes whose interior workings are unobservable. To draw inferences
about trust, we simply compare the variables that go into the box with
the behavior that comes out. This approach permits us to make a
number of important predictions about trust behavior. We could
make far more, however, if we had a cognitive theory of trust-if we
could look inside the box to see what motivates trust behavior.
Unfortunately, the question of what motivates trust remains a subject
of hot debate among social scientists, though some things seem more
likely than others. For example, it seems unlikely that trust behavior is
the result of mental mistake or cognitive error. Researchers in most
experiments have gone to some length to ensure that the players fully
understand the payoff functions with which they are presented 1 2 The
obvious alternative is that trust behavior represents a form of socially
contingent altruism in which people take account of others' welfare in
making their own choices.
But why do people take account of others' welfare? Is trust true
altruism, in which one person is made happy by another's increased
happiness? Or is trust instead motivated by guilt? Perhaps A behaves
MWe are unaware of any significant body of empirical literature testing one-way
trust.

H1 SeeSally, supra note 53, at 70 ("[1]n almost all of the assays, subjects were tested
on their knowledge of the instructions and any mistakes were addressed."). Although
subjects in social dilemmas appear to understand that cooperation reduces their personal payoffs in the game itself, it is harder to rule out the possibility that they, mistakenly believe that they, will interact with their fellow players again sometime in the future, when a decision to defect might be punished. Put differently, other-regarding
behavior may reflect not altruistic preferences but cognitive error in the form of biased
overestimates of the likelihood of reciprocity. (This sort of cognitive error provides
the basis for the joke about the aged professor who always attended his colleagues' funerals for fear that if he did not, they would refuse to attend his.) While this possibility
is an interesting one that hints at the evolutionary origins of trust, it does not change
our analysis. Whether trust is driven by altruism or error, it remains important to an
understanding of how corporations and corporate law reduce agency costs and promote team production in business firms.
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trustworthily toward B not because she wants B to be happy, but because she herself will be guilt-ridden and unhappy if she does not."
Further work on these and related questions would be immensely
valuable. In the meantime, we must content ourselves with a behaviorist approach.
The result is undoubtedly a cartoonish, twodimensional sketch of the complex reality of human behavior. Even
this two-dimensional model, however, gives us a better understanding
of corporations and corporate law than the one-dimensional model of
homo economicus.
III.

TRUST BEHAVIOR AND CORPORATE LAW

The conventional nexus of contracts approach to corporate law
attempts to explain how firms work, and the role of law in making
them work, solely in terms of market incentives and legal obligations.
For the reasons we outlined in Part I, however, these explanations
have not been fully satisfactory. Legal sanctions and market forces often cannot bind corporate participants tightly enough to restrain all
opportunistic behavior (at least if one assumes that participants are
rational and self-interested players). The information requirements
are just too high and the business environment is too complex,
opaque, and uncertain.
As a result, there is reason to believe that trust may play an important role in the success of many business firms. That possibility is of
obvious interest to businesspeople as well as to management theorists
and business consultants who study what makes successful firms tick.
But an understanding of the role of trust in business relationships and
the variables that influence trust is also important for lawmakers, legal
scholars, and practicing lawyers.
We consider below how the behavioral phenomenon of trust can
offer vital insights into a variety of debates and puzzles in contemporary corporate law. We begin by revisiting one of the longest-running
engagements in contemporary corporate scholarship-the battle between the "contractarians" and the "anticontractarians" over the nature of corporate fiduciary duties.
A.

Trust Behavior, the Duty of Loyalty, and the ContractarianAnticontractarianDebate

Corporate case law frequently centers on the fiduciary duties of
113

See, e.g., Dawes & Thaler, supra note 3, at 190-96 (discussing this question).
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loyalty and care that corporate directors and officers are said to owe
the firm and its shareholders, or on the fiduciary duties shareholders
are said to owe to each other."' Indeed, fiduciary relationships lie at
the heart of modem corporate law. Yet what does it mean "to owe a
fiduciary duty?"
According to the contractarian school of corporate scholars, the
answer to this question is "not much." Contractarian commentators
(including such noted theorists as Henry Butler, Frank Easterbrook,
Daniel Fischel, Jonathan Macey, Geoffrey Miller, and Larry Ribstein)
argue that corporate law is best understood as a kind of standard form
contract for governing relationships among officers, directors, and
shareholders."" A corollary of this view is that the contracting parties
should be free to depart from the terms of the standard form whenever they so desire. In particular, the contractarians argue that the
rules of fiduciary duty are and should be viewed as nothing more than
default rules that corporate participants can "opt out" of upon mutual
agreement. 11f
This claim is hotly disputed by an opposing group of equally
prominent scholars that includes Victor Brudney, Robert Clark, Deborah DeMott, Melvin Eisenberg, and Tamar Frankel.1 7 According to
M See Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties,
in PRINCIPALS AND
AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 61 (John W. Pratt & RichardJ. Zeckhauser

eds., 1985) (-Most corporate case law deals ith alleged breaches of fiduciary duties
See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 12, at 71-72; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 12; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395 (1983);Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analy'is of the Fraud-on-the-MarketTheory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1068-69 (1990)
("[C]ourts should treat an allegation of a breach of a fiduciary duty as the), would treat
any other alleged breach of contract."); see also Stephen Mi. Bainbridge, CommunitV and
Statism: A Conservative ContractarianCritique of Progressive CorporateLaw Scholarship, 82
CORNELL L. REv. 856, 858-73 (1997) (discussing the contractual approach); Lucian
Ar),e Bebchuk, The Debate on ContractualFreedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1395, 1395-96, 1426-34 (1989) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Debate) (describing the debate);
William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91
YALE. L.J. 1521, 1526 (1982) (adopting the contractual approach).
11. See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 12, at 28-32. This could
be done, for example, through a charter provision that eliminates officers' and directors' fiduciary
duties. Delaware permits corporations to adopt charter provisions that significantly
restrict directors' monetary liabilityfor breach of the duty of care. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b) (7) (Supp. 2000). However, this is not necessarily the same thing as excusing
directors from their duty of care. See infra note 150.
7 See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 12, at 1403-10; Clark, supra note
114, at 61; Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE LJ. 879;
Melin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1461
(1989); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REv. 1209 (1995)
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these anticontractarians, it is misleading and fundamentally mistaken
to apply the rhetoric of contract to fiduciary duties; describing a fiduciary relationship as a "contract" misses the heart of that special
bond."8 Anticontractarians also generally disagree with the notion
that corporate officers and directors should be permitted to opt out of
their fiduciary duties. In particular, they argue that the duty of loyalty
is not a default rule but a mandatory rule that should be enforced by
courts without regard to any apparent agreement otherwise.'"
The war between the contractarians and the anticontractarians
has raged for two decades and produced a voluminous literature12"
We cannot hope to resolve that debate here or even fully address it.
Instead, we demonstrate how the phenomenon of trust behavior helps
to explain both the nature and the intensity of the anticontractarians'
objections to the contractarian position. In particular, we explore
how the empirical evidence surveyed in Part II supports the claim that
there are fundamental differences between fiduciary relationships and
the types of relationships normally thought of as contractual. It also
suggests that significant dangers arise in treating fiduciary duty rules
as default rules that can be freely contracted around.
To understand why, consider the basic elements of fiduciary duty.
The hallmark of a fiduciary relationship is the legal requirement that
the fiduciary act for the exclusive benefit of her beneficiary." To discourage self-interest from rearing its head, the law prohibits her from
using her position to reap any personal benefit without her benefici[hereinafter Frankel, FiduciaryDuties]; Tamar Frankel, FiduciaiyLaw, 71 CAL. L. REV.
795 (1983) [hereinafter Frankel, FiduciayLaw].
", See, e.g., Brudney, supranote 12, at 1404 (arguing that, when applied to corporate fiduciary duties, "the rhetoric of contract proceeds on doubtful assumptions about

the circumstances of the parties, imports inappropriate normative consequences to
govern the relationships thus assumed, and serves the ideological function of legitimating ... managerial discretion ... to serve itself at the expense of investors"); Clark, su-

pra note 114, at 60 (noting that the "extreme contractualist viewpoint ... is likely to
blind us to most of the features of the modem public corporation that are distinctive,
puzzling, and worth exploring"); DeMott, supra note 117, at 879-80 ("Resorting unreflectively to contract rhetoric is insidiously misleading and provides no rationale for
further development of the law of fiduciary obligation.").
119See, e.g., Clark, supra note 114, at 64 ("[S]ome important
corporate law rules

cannot be bargained around .... Basic fiduciary duties fall in this category.. .. ");
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, CorporateLaw and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1253, 1275
(1999) [hereinafter Eisenberg, CorporateLaw] ("[I]f the duty of loyalty was contractual,
it would follow that the duty could be... waived by agreement. Generally speaking,
however, it cannot be.").
120 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 12, 115-19.
21 See Clark, supra note 114, at 73 (noting that a
fiduciary must act only for the
beneficiary's interest); DeMott, supra note 117, at 882 (same).
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ary's authorization, even when she could do so without harming her
beneficiary."" And a fiduciary is expected to act in her beneficiary's

interest even when-especially when-the beneficiary cannot monitor
or control the fiduciary's behavior.'2
As these basic principles of fiduciary law make clear, the keystone
of the fiduciary relationship lies in the fiduciary's commitment to
abandon self-interest and promote her beneficiary's welfare instead of
her own.' ' As Justice Cardozo put it in the famous case of Meinhardv.
Salmon:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting
at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee
is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then
the standard of behavior.

...Sahnon had put himself in a position
in which thought of self was to be
'
2
irnounced, however hard the abnegation.

Cardozo's message is unmistakable: A fiduciary must "renounce"
self-interest in favor of pursuing the interests of another. Expressed in
terms of the evidence reviewed in Part II, what makes a fiduciary a fiduciary is that she has an obligation to behave as if she has adopted an
other-regardingpreferencefunction. If she fails to do this, the courts condemn her in terms that are didactic and full of moral fervor."2 6
Recognizing that fiduciary duties demand other-regarding behavior reveals the heart of the distinction between fiduciary relationships
1_,t
Se, Clark, supra note 114, at 73-74 (discussing the prohibition against "secret
profits"); DeMott, supra note 117, at 908 (same). This rule against using one's fiduciary position to extract gains beyond one's express compensation provides the foundation fbr the state law prohibition against insider trading discussed in cases such as Dianond v. Oremnio, 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969). This state law prohibition should not
be confused uith federal rules, such as the prohibition implied under Rule lOb-5 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See generallySOLOMON ET AL., supra note 2, at 92784 (discussing federal law on insider trading).
I Se,Brudney, supranote 12, at 1415 (noting that corporate law gives
managers "a
ide, and in many respects unpoliceable, range of discretion").
)LAIt should be noted that the fiduciary relationship is not purely altruistic; a fiduciary is entitled to receive the compensation explicitly agreed upon when she entered
the relationship.
164 N.E. 545,546-48 (N.Y. 1928) (emphasis added).
Ser Clark, supra note 114, at 75-76 (discussing moral rhetoric employed in fiduciary duty cases); Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 117, at 830 ("[M]oral theme is an
important part of fiduciary law. Loyalty, fidelity, faith and honor form its basic vocabulary.").
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and the sorts of relationships commonly thought of as contractual.'!
Unlike fiduciary relationships, conventional contracts start from the
assumption that the contracting parties are purely self-interested
actors whose behavior must be channeled by external constraints.
Thus the archetypal contract emerges from arm's-length bargaining
between two parties who each seek to serve only their own ends and
promote only their own welfare. Moreover, each party is free to
decline to perform and pay damages instead if breach serves her selfinterest. Describing a relationship as a contract both assumes and
legitimates the adoption
of a purely self-interested preference function
12 8
by both parties.

It seems peculiar indeed-given the importance of self-regarding
behavior to conventional contract and the centrality of otherregarding behavior to the fiduciary "contract"-to describe both with
the same label. Contractarian corporate scholars nevertheless persist
in describing the fiduciary relationship between corporate officers
and directors on the one side, and the firm and its shareholders on
the other, as a subspecies of contract, an "agency" arrafigement in
which one party is paid to do another's bidding.
Because this apMany fiduciary relationships might still be described as "contractual" in the
broad sense that both the fiduciary and the beneficiary enter the relationship voluntarily. It should be noted, however, that fiduciary obligations also can arise by operation
of law, a fact that again hints at a fundamental distinction from contract. See DeMott,
supra note 117, at 910-11.
128See Clark, supra note 114, at 75 ("I]udges have sometimes seemed to beliele
that a contracting party should feel perfectly free, in a psychological and moral sense,
to break a contract, so long as he or she is prepared to pay the damages.... But in the
case of fiduciary duties, courts... try to create feelings of guilt for violation of duty
and rectitude for fulfillment of duty."); Frankel, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 117, at
1268 (contrasting the "model of contract relationship representing mutual suspicion,
'realistic' mistrust, and independence" with the "model of fiduciary relationship
representing trust and dependency").
12 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty,
36J. L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993) ("[A] 'fiduciary' relation is a contractual one characterized by unusually high costs of specification and monitoring.... Fiduciary duties
are not special duties; they have no moral footing."); see also John H. Langbein, The
ContractarianBasis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE LJ. 625, 650 (1995) (discussing the
"functional correspondence of trust and contract"). One of the oddities of this view, as
anticontractarians have noted, is that it glosses over the fact that in agency relationships the principal can control and direct the agent's acts. See Clark, supra note 114, at
56; Brudney, supra note 12, at 1428. Hence there is no need for the agent to adopt the
principal's preferences: The principal can protect her interests through her control of
the agent. In contrast, a key characteristic of a fiduciary relationship is that the beneficiary cedes a wide range of discretion to the fiduciary. See Frankel, Fiducialy Law, supra
note 117, at 809 (stating that the central feature of fiduciary relation is the delegation
of control). This is true as well of shareholders in a publicly held corporation, who
127
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proach obscures the essence of the fiduciary obligation, it is not surprising that, as Dean Clark has pointed out, contractarian theorists
"have done little to explain the concept of the fiduciary [or] to develop positive theories as to why fiduciary law has developed its particular doctrines and characteristics. " '" After all, if one assumes that
the contracting parties are purely selfish, trying to control opportunistic behavior by asking individuals to adopt an other-regarding preference function makes about as much sense as trying to change the dietary habits of wolves by telling them to like vegetables instead of meat.
Contractarian analysis, like neoclassical economics, treats preferences
as fixed and exogenous. How can someone choose to alter her own
preferences?
Yet the empirical evidence on trust reviewed in Part II demonstrates that people behave as if they do change preferences-and they
do so on a regular and predictable basis. This evidence may offer
valuable guidance to scholars and lawmakers seeking to understand
better the nature of the fiduciary duties courts impose on corporate
officers, directors, and shareholders.' '
The phenomenon of trust behavior suggests that fiduciary relationships are created by the law in situations in which it is efficient or
otherwise desirable to promote other-regarding, trusting and trustworthy behavior. Moreover, the key to a successful fiduciary relationship lies in framing both economic and social conditions so as to encourage the fiduciary to make a psychological commitment to further
her beneficiary's welfare rather than her own."' For example, by making directors and officers who violate their duty of loyalty to the firm
liable for damages, the law encourages trustworthy behavior in corporate fiduciaries by reducing the expected gains from malfeasance
have extremely limited power over officers and directors. See CLARK, supra note 13, at
56-57; Brudney, supra note 12, at 1428 ("Stockholders do not direct management's ac-

tivities.").
Clark, supra note 114, at 62.
More broadly, a behavioral approach can guide judges and scholars seeking to
determine whether and when a given legal relationship should be deemed to have a
fiduciary character and what the substantive requirements for fiduciaries ought to be.
A-s a number of commentators have noted, legal scholars have yet to produce a coherent positive theory of fiduciary duties. See, e.g., id- at 71 ("[Plerhaps because the sub"

ject matter is so elusive, there has been little legal analysis of the fiduciary concept that
is simultaneously general, sustained, and astute."); DeMott, supra note 117, at 908-15
(describing the fiduciary obligation as "one of the most elusive concepts in AngloAmerican law," one that "eludes theoretical capture").
1,- It may be important for the law, where possible, to minimize external incentives
inconsistent with that psychological commitment. See, e.g., supra text accompanying
note 122 (describing the rule against private profits).
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(thus reducing the fiduciary's cost of behaving trustworthily).' At the
same time, case law on the duty of loyalty unambiguously signals that
the fiduciary relationship is a social situation that calls for otherregarding behavior, to the point where the fiduciary is discouraged
from even thinking about her own interest through a prophylactic
rule that bans unauthorized personal gains even in circumstances in
which the fiduciary could arrange this without harm to her beneficiary. 3 4 Similarly, the sermonizing tone typically adopted by courts in
fiduciary cases reinforces the social message that other-regarding behavior is demanded.
A behavioral analysis of the fiduciary relationship accordingly
supports the anticontractarian view that it is fundamentally misleading-even dangerous-to apply the rhetoric of contract to fiduciary
duties. Such an analysis also lends credence to the anticontractarian
claim that corporate officers and directors ought not to be allowed to
opt out of their fiduciary duties through bylaws, charter provisions, or
employment agreements.
The contractarian argument for opting out is simple; if participants in a corporation perceive it as in their mutual interest to opt out
of the rules of fiduciary duty, why not let them? While this argument
is straightforward, anticontractarians point out that it overlooks an
important possibility-that allowing participants in one firm to opt
out of fiduciary duties may harm participants in other firms by introducing what might be called an "informational externality."' ' In par-

133

This approach may seem on first inspection consistent with the hono economicus

model of purely selfish behavior. However, closer inspection suggests at least two puzzles. First, the typical remedy for a loyalty violation is to compel the fiduciary to return

whatever she stole from her beneficiary (for example, voiding a self-dealing transaction) or to disgorge any profits she has wrongfully earned. See generally CLRK, supra
note 13, at 160 (discussing voiding transactions); id. at 224 (discussing disgorgement).
In effect, the fiduciary is simply put back in the position she was in before she violated
her duties. This creates insufficient incentives for purely selfish fiduciaries to remain
loyal, given the chance that wrongful conduct would not be detected or punished.
Second, discouraging fiduciaries from looking out for their own interests does not nec-

essarily give them an incentive to do a good job looking out for someone else's. However, once we allow for the possibility of trust behavior, the duty of loyalty makes sense
as a means of encouraging trustworthy behavior by reducing the costs associated with
it. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102 (discussing the inverse relationship between cost and incidence of trustworthiness).
134 See supra text accompanying note 122 (discussing the prohibition against unauthorized personal benefit).
135See generally Bebchuk, Debate, supra note 115, at 1406-07 (describing the anticontractarian argument); Butler & Ribstein, supra note 12, at 33-38 (same); Gordon, supra
note 12, at 1567-69, 1593 (same).
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ticular, alloxing corporate officers and directors to opt out of fiducial , duties introduces ambiguity about whether someone who is called
"officer" or "director" can be safely assumed to have made a commitment to put the firm's interests ahead of her own. This uncertainty
requires individuals who want to participate in a business relationship
to expend time, effort, and resources to determine whether their fiduciaries are really fiduciaries. For example, a potential investor interested in a particular company might have to obtain and read that
firn's charter, bylaws, and employment contracts in order to research
whether or not the company's officers and directors bore fiduciary duties. Because increasing investors' research costs reduces their willingniess to pay for shares, allouing officers and directors to opt out of
the duty of loyalty in one firm imposes external costs on other firms by
diluting the informational content of the "officer" and "director" labels.'
Strict contractarians might answer that such external costs may be
negligible if the cost of investors' informing themselves about opt-out
provisions is small. Alternatively, even if external costs are large, they
might be worth bearing if opting out adds value in a significant number of cases. But behavioral analysis suggests that the costs of allowing
opting out are likely to be large indeed, and the benefits quite small.
On the cost side, trust-based analysis suggests that the central purpose of fiduciary law is to induce trust behavior by socially framing fiduciary relationships as relationships in which the law expects the fiduciary to internalize a commitment to pursue her beneficiary's
interests rather than her own. Allowing individuals in similar roles to
opt out of such a commitment undermines both the very foundation
" In a publicly held firm with thousands or even hundreds of thousands
of shareholders, the total additional cost may be substantial indeed.
1,7 From an ex ante perspective, the cost is borne by the promoters of the firm
because shareholders discount the price that the) will pay for shares to reflect the increased research cost of determining whether the firm's directors and officers are in
fact fiduciaries. Set Bebchuk, Debate, supra note 115, at 1406-07 (discussing "imperfect
information" arguments); Gordon, supra note 12, at 1567-69, 1593 (discussing the
"public good h)pothesis" that mandatory rules reduce the external costs of uncertainty
about the corporate contract, and noting that "a stable conception of fiduciary duty
dei clops only through applying a single standard across a great range of cases").
A second, "quasi-anticontractarian" argument against opting out focuses on the
problems associated with "midstream" changes to corporate articles and bylaws and the
possibility that obstacles to collective action might prevent shareholders from successfilly opposing amendments that reduce their group welfare. See Bebchuk, supra note
12 (discussing reasons for limiting the ability to opt out midstream); Bebchuk, Debate,
%Iip)anote 115 (same); see also Gordon, supra note 12, at 1573-85 (discussing the "opportunistic amendment h),pothesis").
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and the source of the economic value of the concept of a fiduciary relationship.'3
What about the possible benefits of opting out? Trust behavior
seems most likely to be important in situations in which the trusting
person cannot easily monitor or control the trusted person's behavior
through external incentives. 9 Legal scholars note that it is in exactly
such situations that fiduciary relationships are most likely to be created. 40 And it is in exactly such situations that an informed beneficiary would be most reluctant to free her fiduciary from the psychological constraints on self-interest imposed by the notion of a duty of
loyalty. Perhaps we might want to permit fiduciaries to be able to deal
at arm's length with their beneficiaries in discrete transactions (for
example, in setting the fiduciary's compensation or in a sale of a specific property between the parties). In fact, the law permits this when
certain substantive and procedural safeguards are met."' But why
would any beneficiary ever want to make herself categorically vulnerable to someone who had no external or internal incentive to protect
her interests? It seems implausible that allowing officers, directors,
and shareholders to opt out of the fiduciary duties normally imposed
138As Melvin Eisenberg has put it in the corporate context,
"the critical role of

trust in the success of the corporate system would be significantly undermined if the
law sent a message that the duty of loyalty was essentially a contractual duty." Eisenberg,,CorporateLaw, supra note 119, at 1275.
Implicit in this notion is the idea that violations of the duty of loyalty
are difficult to detect or prove in court. This cuts against the standard assumption that the
principal purpose of fiduciary duty rules is to channel behavior by allowing courts to
intervene and sanction or reward fiduciaries on beneficiaries' behalf. See, e.g., DeMott,
supra note 117, at 915 ("[F]iduciary obligation is a device that enables the law to respond to a range of situations in which... one person's discretion ought to be controlled ....); Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 117, at 816 ("Because the entrustor
cannot satisfactorily protect himself.., the law must intervene to protect him ....
").
In contrast, our behavioral analysis suggests that the legal rules of fiduciary lo)alty
promote trustworthy behavior not so much by threatening to sanction fiduciaries as by
changing their preferences. Later we pursue a parallel argument with regard to the
corporate law duty of care. See infra text accompanying notes 155-77.
140See DeMott, supra note 117, at 901, 908, 914; Frankel, Fiduciay
Law, supra note
117, at 808-09.
141See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991) (allowing
interested directors of a
firm to contract with the firm as long as the material facts are known and the noninterested directors or the shareholders approve or as long as the contract is fair to the
firm). Victor Brudney has recently argued that corporate law has gone too far in permitting this, with the net result of undermining the duty of loyalty. Victor Brudney,
Revisiting the Import of Shareholder Consent for CorporateFiduciaryLoyalty Obligations,25 J.
CORP. L. 209 (1999); see also Mitchell, Fairness and Trust, supra note 32, at 426 (arguing
that allowing transactions between a fiduciary and a beneficiary that meet a "fairness
test" undermines fiduciary relationships).
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by corporate law would be mutually desired in more than a handful of
cases.
This is not to suggest that it is never advantageous to structure
business relationships as arm's length relationships or that business
participants should never be allowed to opt out of fiduciary duties
when they can do this without muddying the informational waters.
For example, opting out is clearly unobjectionable when it is done by
selecting another business form, such as a partnership or a joint venture."- However, an analysis of corporate law that takes account of the
phenomenon of trust supports the anticontractarians' distaste for
viering corporate fiduciary duties as just another default term in a
corporate form contract. As Tamar Frankel has observed, "[I]n terms
of both psychological fact and organization of the law, a name is important and reclassification can be treacherous. When we blur the
distinctions between fiduciary and contract relationships, calling them
by the same name, we tend to disregard the reasons for the different
rules that govern them."" We also run the risk of destroying the
common understanding of social context that triggers the emergence
of trusting and trustworthy behavior in fiduciary relationships in the
first place.
B. Trust Behavior, the Duty of Care, and the BusinessJudgmentRule
The discussion above suggests that corporate law may alter the
behavior of corporate participants not just by changing their external
payoffs but also by changing their internalized preferences. But how,
exactly, does the law accomplish this? We consider this question in
connection with one of the most persistent and puzzling problems in
corporate law: the relationship between the duty of care and the
businessjudgment rule.
In theory, the directors of a corporation owe the firm and its
shareholders a duty to manage the business with the skill, diligence,
and care of a reasonably prudent person. " In practice, it is notoriously difficult for a plaintiff to win a claim of breach of the duty of
H-1S,' Gordon, supra note 12, at 1597 ("[Where] fiduciary duties govern, why
would shareholders %%-ant to opt out... ? It would be irrational for shareholders to
aixc, or modify substantially the directors' duty of loyalty....").
St, Charles Rogers O'Kelley, Jr., Opting In and Out of FiduciaryDuties in Cooperatin; 1w'ntures: Rtfining the So-Calhd Coasean Contract Theoy, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 353, 358
(1992) (discussing the "signaling effect" of choosing a particular business form).
Frankel, FiduciaqDuties, supra note 117, at 1211 (footnote omitted).
CLUPK, supra note 13, at 123.
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care. AsJudge Winter observed in the oft-citedJoy v. North:
While it is often stated that corporate directors and officers will be liable
for negligence in carrying out their corporate duties, all seem agreed
that such a statement is misleading.... [L]iability is rarely imposed
upon corporate directors or officers simply for bad judgment and this reluctance to impose liability... has been doctrinally labeled the business
judgment rule.

Case law describes the business judgment rule as "'a presumption
that... the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interests of the company. '"' 47 The elements of "good faith" and
an "honest belief' that one is serving the company's best interests are
usually undisputed in cases that do not raise the sort of conflicts of interest typically analyzed under the duty of loyalty."' Thus, whether or
not the business judgment rule applies will usually turn on whether a
board's act was "informed."
In the watershed case of Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court declared that directors will be deemed uninformedand so outside the protection of the business judgment rule-only
when the plaintiff can demonstrate that they were grossly negligent in
failing to inform themselves, before acting, "'of all material
information reasonably available to them."14 The net effect of this
rule is to insulate directors from liability whenever they make even a
modest attempt to follow the appropriate formalities for reaching a
decision. Provided proper procedures are followed, the business
judgement rule precludes any further judicial inquiry into the
substantive wisdom of the decision.
Even in the rare case in which directors might be found to have
employed grossly defective procedures, other barriers stand between
them and personal exposure to liability. For example, since the enactment of section 102 (b) (7) of Delaware's General Corporation Law,

16

147

692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v.

Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
148 See, e.g., id. at 873 (noting, in a duty of care case that focused on whether directors were informed, that "there were no allegations of fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing"
and that therefore "considerations of motive are irrelevant to the issue before us").
149 Id. at 872 (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812). For example, in
Smith v. Van
Gorkom, the directors of Trans Union were denied the protection of the business
judgement rule when they approved the sale of the company in a two-hour meeting on
the basis of a short oral report by the CEO. See id. at 868-70 (outlining the board's decisionmaking process).
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many corporations have taken advantage of that provision by adopting
charter provisions that expressly eliminate director liability for monetar, damages for breach of the duty of care.'5
When section
102(b) (7) does not apply, the rules of derivative suit procedure may
require a would-be shareholder plaintiff to allege (before any discovery) "particularized facts" supporting his claim.) Should the plaintiff
meet this burden and be allowed to proceed, Delaware law permits
the directors to create an "independent committee" that may be able
to terminate his suit.5 2 Finally, even if the directors are ultimately

found liable for breach of the duty of care, any damages they must pay
often will be reimbursed under a directors' and officers' liability insurance policy.'
The net result is that, as a practical matter, a negligent director is
more likely to be hit by lightning after leaving her board meeting than
she is to pay damages. Why then would any rational director
expend
4
significant time or effort to manage a company with care?
To answer this question, we begin by highlighting another mysterious aspect of the case law on the duty of care that has long provoked
law professors and students alike-the fact that, even while courts
have steadfastly refused actually to sanction directors for failing to use
due care, they have continued to insist that a duty to use reasonable

1"',DEL. CODE. A,\,N. tit. 8, § 102(b) (7) (Supp. 2000). Some might describe
section
102(b) (7) as allowing firms to "opt out" of the duty of care. We reject this characterization because the provision does not excuse directors from using care-it merely reliescs them of personal liability for damages for failing to do so. See, e.g., Rock, supra
note 13, at 1012 ("[Slection 102(b)(7) ... allows Delaware corporations to opt out of
director liability for breach of duty of care ... ." (emphasis added)). A contractarian
scholar might respond that these are the same thing. Such an analysis overlooks the
distinction between a standard of conduct and a standard of judicial review. See infra
text accompanying notes 158-59 (discussing the distinction). Nor does it account for
.section 102(b) (7)'s failure to bar injunctive relief based on a duty of care violation.
Aronmon, 473 A.2d at 814.
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785 (Del. 1981).
For example, in Smith v. Van Gorkom itself, the defendant directors settled the
claims against them for S23.5 million. Of that amount, $10 million was paid by their
insurance carrier, and nearly the entire balance by the company with which they had
negotiated the merger. SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 2, at 704.

I' Although our discussion focuses on the fact that the duty of care does not appear to provide a persuasive stick with which to threaten directors, note the shortage of
carrots as well. Even in firms in which some component of director compensation is
based on stock performance rather than a fiat fee, any single director's efforts at care
are likely to have only an infinitesimal effect on her paycheck when compared with
other factors such as industry changes, stock market movements, and executives' effort
and savvy (not to mention the efforts and savvy of the other members of the board).
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care exists.' 55 Van Gorkom itself offers an example. In interpreting the
"informed" element of the business judgment rule, the Delaware Supreme Court held, "[t] he determination of whether a business judgment is an informed one turns on whether the directors have informed themselves... 'of all material information reasonably available
to them." '5 6 The court then went on to state, "[w]e think the concept
of gross negligence is ...the proper standard for determining whether a
judgment reached by a board of directors was an informed
business
57
one."
Consider the schizophrenic quality of this statement. In exhorting directors to inform themselves of all material information reasonably available, the court uses the language of negligence, impliedly
testing directors' conduct by the standard of the "reasonable person."
Yet in the next breath, the court makes clear that no liability will be
imposed unless the directors are grossly negligent-a far more lax
standard of behavior. 5 This bipolar aspect of corporate case law has
been noted by a number of scholars, among them Melvin Eisenberg,
who has prominently argued that in corporate law generally-and in
duty of care cases in particular-"the standards of conduct and review
pervasively diverge." 5' The standard of conduct for directors (courts
say) is that of the reasonably prudent person. But the standard of review (that is, the circumstances under which courts will intervene and
impose sanctions) is the business judgement test of gross negligence.
Why is the standard of review in duty of care cases so much less
demanding than the standard of conduct? The most frequent explanation offered is that the business world is complex, opaque, and uncertain. As a result, it is almost impossible for a judge, after the fact,
to determine reliably whether a particular board's decision was or was
not reasonable at the time it was made. Making it easy for plaintiffs to
prevail in duty of care cases accordingly could result in frequent legal
error, as courts both dismiss meritorious cases and award damages in

.55
See sources cited supra note 13.
156Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson, 473
A.2d at 812 (emphasis added)).
15 Id. at 873 (emphasis added).
158 Such case law tempts one to muse along with Dean Clark about "whether the
courts are serious when they say directors may be held liable for negligence." CLARK,
supra note 13, at 126.
159 Eisenberg, CorporateLaw, supra note 119, at 1269; see also Eisenberg,
Divergence,
supra note 13, at 437 (discussing the divergence of the standards of conduct from the
standards of review within corporate law).
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The first type of error undermines, perhaps fa-

tally, the value of lawsuits as vehicles for deterring careless conduct.
The second raises the specter of other harms, such as groundless
"strike" suits filed by plaintiffi' lawyers who hope to extract a settlement, or overanxious directors who avoid any risky course of business,
however profitable."'

These are good reasons for courts to make it difficult to sue corporate directors for negligence. But there remains the essential question of why directors shielded from liability for negligence should
bother to exercise due care. Also, if the business judgment rule is the
proper standard of review, what purpose is served by suggesting that
the standard of conduct be higher?
Under the nexus of contracts approach and its assumption of rational selfishness, the mysteries of the business judgement rule and
the duty of care remain just that-mysteries. If directors respond only
to carrots and sticks, and if both are noticeably missing from the
boardroom, why should we expect directors to do (as they mostly
seem to do) tolerably decentjobs of representing the interests of firms
and their shareholders? And why do courts continue to preach the
gospel of due care while refusing to punish the "sinners" who fail to
meet that standard? 2' Why should a court waste its breath?
Both Melvin Eisenberg and Edward Rock have recently offered
provocative and related answers to these questions. Writing separately
in articles published in 1997 and 1999, Eisenberg and Rock each note
that over the past two decades, the relevant standard of conduct for
corporate directors under Delaware law has shifted and become more
demanding, even as the standard ofjudicial review has become, if anything, more lax.'e'- They further argue that conventional corporate
law scholarship cannot explain such developments because it fails to
incorporate the important phenomenon of social norms.!" In par)..See generally Lynn A. Stout, Type IError,Type 11 Error, and the Private Securities
Litigatioli Refonn Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 711 (1996) (discussing both types of legal error).
SeeJoy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886-87 (1982).
Rock, supra note 13, at 1009.
V-3See Eisenberg, CorporateLaw, supra note 119, at 1266-69 ("The common experience of informed observers is that the level of directorial care has risen significantly in
the last ten years or so .... What has caused this shift to a greater level of care? Pretty
clearly, not an increased threat of liability."); Rock, supra note 13, at 1021-39 (describing the evolution of the heightened standard of conduct in a series of five management buyout cases, out of which the court only enjoined one transaction).
1-4 Rock and Eisenberg use the term "norm" to refer to rules
of conduct that influence behavior through some mechanism other than the imposition of legal sanctions.
S,,, Eisenberg, Corporate Law, supra note 119, at 1255 ("I use the term social norm to
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ticular, they argue that corporate case law, and especially fiduciary
duty case law, influences corporate managers' behavior not primarily
by threatening liability but by expressing and reinforcing social norms
of careful and loyal behavior.'6 As Rock puts it, "[F]iduciary duty law
evolves primarily at the level of norms rather than the level of rules.""
The claim that corporate law works primarily by clarifying and expressing social norms is appealing to anyone who has struggled to
reconcile the duty of care standard and the business judgment rule.
However, this argument begs a fundamental question. Corporate law
work? 1 7,
may work by shaping social norms, but how do social norms
Why should officers, directors, or shareholders comply with the norms
the courts express? Rock and Eisenberg each address this question to
a limited extent. Yet in the end their analyses are not complete and,
for this reason, not entirely convincing. What is missing-and what
can make a norms-based theory of corporate law both powerful and
persuasive-is the empirical phenomenon of trust behavior.
In making their arguments, Eisenberg and Rock each note that
individuals may "internalize" norms to the point where they obey
them automatically, even when a failure to obey the norm would go
unnoted by others."' However, they fail to explain under what circumstances a norm becomes interalized9 Moreover, Rock in particular appears reluctant to rely on internalized norms as strong constraints on behavior. He views social norms as being enforced first
and foremost through social "shaming"--"disdain in the eyes of one's
acquaintances, the loss of [future] directorships, the harm to one's
mean all rules and regularities concerning human conduct, other than legal rules and
organizational rules [which] have the effect of legal rules."); Rock, supra note 13, at
1011 (excluding behavior driven by fear of legal sanction or the pressures of formal
markets such as the market for corporate control). In their recent work, Rock and Michael Wachter abandon the norms label and instead propose the acronym NLERS, for
"nonlegally enforceable rules and standards." Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter,
Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 1619, 1641 (2001).
165See Eisenberg, Corporate Law, supra note 119, at 1265 ("[D]irectorial care is
largely driven by social norms, rather than by the threat of liability .... ."); Rock, supra
note 13, at 1016 ("My claim... is that the Delaware courts generate in the first instance the legal standards... which influence the development of the social norms of
directors [and] officers .... ).
:66 Rock, supra note 13, at 1097.
67 See supra note 27 (discussing norms and how they might work).
1068See Eisenberg, CorporateLaw, supra note 119, at 1258-61 (discussing internalization); Rock, supra note 13, at 1013 (same).
169 Eisenberg suggests that guilt might motivate people to comply with
"obligational norms." However, he does not offer a theory of when or why guilt is likely to
come into play. Eisenberg, CorporateLaw, supra note 119, at 1259.

20011

BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORA TE LA W

1795

reputation."1 '
In Part I, we described the fear of such slings and arrows as falling
within the broad category of "market sanctions" in order to emphasize
its essentially external character. In relying primarily on social sanctions and reputational concerns to explain why norms are followed,
Rock follows the lead of some of the most prominent and pioneering
legal scholars writing today on law and norms.' 7' But while the idea
that people might follow a social norm to avoid reputational harm
at least in the
and social shaming seems plausible, we believe that,
7
1
mark.1
the
miss
may
approach
this
context,
corporate
ks discussed in Part I, one of the fundamental problems associated with controlling opportunism within firms through legal sanctions is that it is often difficult or impossible to detect and prove opportunistic behavior in court. Opportunism that cannot be proven in
a court of law may also be difficult to prove in the court of public
opinion. Even when other members of the business community can
observe accusations and disagreements between and among shareholders, officers, and directors, they may find it hard to determine
which side is at fault. Moreover, in many cases they are unlikely to observe even the accusations and disagreements. The boardroom is a
notoriously opaque environment. 7 " Even in large firms, only the most
public and bitter battles are reported in the press. Smaller firms may
7"Rock, supra note 13, at 1104; see id. at 1013-14 ("The story I tell in this Article is
very much the story of how a small community imposes formal and informal, legal and
nonlegal, sanctions on its members."); see also David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate
Law, 149 U. PR.L. RENV. 1811 (2001) (discussing "shaming" sanctions).
See supra notes 23, 27 (discussing norms literature); see also Robert C. Ellickson,
The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from the Legal Academy 3-5 (2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (reviewing norms literature and discussing norms scholars' focus on third-party enforcement), available at http://
paper.ssrn.com/paper.taf?_abstract_id=191392
0 Perhaps norms scholars focus on third-party sanctioning
in order to keep their
arguments consistent with the rational selfishness model. However, this simply moves
the problem one step back. See supra note 27.
Rock argues that the managers and directors of large publicly held corporations
"form a surprisingly small and close-knit community." Rock, supra note 13, at 1013. In
Support of this claim, Rock estimates that this "small" community consists of at least
orfive
w1,ur thousand individuals. Moreover, Rock's estimate includes only directors of
Foirtune 500 companies. Id. at 1013 & n.7. But see Stephen P. Ferris et al., Monitoring
by Directors iwith Multiple Board Appointments: Corporate Performance and the Incidence of Securities Fraud 7 (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file ith authors)
(reporting the results of an empirical study of a sample of 45,000 directors that found
that only four percent sat on three or more boards, and that even among the Fortune
500I companies, fewer than twenty percent sat on three or more boards), available at
http://paper.. srn.com/paper.tafeabstractid=167288.
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go years without seeing their names-much less their individual directors' or officers' names-mentioned in the Wall StreetJournaL
The fear of social sanctions as a result seems likely to provide only
a weak constraint on opportunism within firms.1 7 ' But the idea that
norms may be a potent force for altering behavior becomes far more
persuasive if we add trust to the equation. This is because the empirical evidence on trust sheds light on both why and when social norms
become "internalized."
As we saw in Part II, individuals' decisions to adopt either a competitive or a cooperative mode of behavior are often determined by
their perceptions of others' expectations, likely behaviors, and relationships with themselves."7 5 These social cues both define and determine the appropriate norm of behavior. When social context says
"cooperate," cooperative behavior is the norm; when context calls for
self-interested behavior, competition prevails.
Corporate case law accordingly can encourage corporate participants to internalize norms of cooperation through social framingproviding information about the social context of relationships within
the firm. Judicial opinions unambiguously communicate that directors are fiduciaries and that fiduciary relationships call for trustworthy
(loyal and careful) behavior. Corporate directors internalize this
norm when they respond to the social signal by adopting the otherregarding preference function that is the hallmark of trust-based relationships. In other words, fiduciary duty law works throughframing, not
shaming.
The behavioral phenomenon of trust thus offers a critical addition
to the arguments of Eisenberg, Rock, and other scholars who argue
for norms-based theories of corporate law. In particular, it provides
support for the idea that discussions of fiduciary duty in corporate
case law act as judicial "sermons" on proper motives and conduct that
filter down to directors, officers, and shareholders through corporate
lawyers and the business press 7 6 Courts preach these sermons not to
enlist the aid of third-party "norms enforcers," but primarily to influence corporate participants' behavior more directly by fleshing out

174

SeeEisenberg, CorporateLaw, supra note 119, at 1261 (suggesting that, "[w]ithout

a significant degree of internalization.... reputafional effects will usually be insufficient" to enforce social norms of corporate behavior).
7.5See supraPart II.D (discussing the role of social
context).
76 See Rock, supra note 13, at 1067-72 (describing how judicial opinions are com-

municated to corporate participants through judges' speeches, the business press, and
lawyers' "memoranda to our clients").
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the social context of their relationships, and particularly by framing
relationships between managers and their firms as fiduciary relationships based on trust.
The empirical evidence reviewed in Part II suggests why judicial
opinions may be especially powerful and effective vehicles for performing this framing function. 77 Social dilemma experiments indicate that individuals trying to decide whether a particular social context calls for cooperation or competition are remarkably sensitive to
the signals they receive from the experimenter who defines and has
authority over the game. In the context of corporate law, the court, as
the authority charged with both creating and enforcing many corporate law rules, may play the role of the experimenter and enjoy similar
influence. When the Delaware chancery court trumpets the importance of careful attention to fiduciary duties, directors and officers are
likely to heed that call-even though they may have little or no external incentive for doing so.
Corporate case law may also have a second and previously unrecognized effect on director, officer, and shareholder behavior through
the information that it provides about the behavior of other directors,
officers, and shareholders. Recall that one of the important influences on decisions to cooperate or defect in social dilemma games
appears to be expectations about what other players are likely to do. 75
That finding raises the possibility that judicial doctrines, such as the
business judgment rule, that make it difficult to sue corporate participants for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty may in fact reduce the incidence of such breaches. Conversely, trying to shore up trust behavior by making it easier for corporate participants to "litigate trust" may
produce the counterintuitive result of an increase in the incidence of
the untrustworthy behavior.
The argument goes as follows. Lawsuits can indeed help deter
opportunism by creating a threat that opportunistic behavior will be
punished, if detected and proven. But at the same time, lawsuits-if
members of the business community are aware of them-unavoidably
send the signal that others in the business world are choosing to violate their fiduciary duties. The more suits brought, the stronger the
signal."71
S, supra Part II.D.1 (discussing the role of authorities' instructions).
S,,So
supra Part II.D.3 (discussing the role of expectations about others' behavior).
7, A proliferation of shareholder
lawsuits brought against corporate directors
trust
behavior
by
signaling that shareholders view the relationmight also discourage
l77
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The net result is that the deterrent effect of making it easier for
plaintiffs to sue for breach of fiduciary duty may be outweighed by a
second and countervailing effect-the increase in opportunistic behavior that results from suggesting that breach of duty is common,
even normal, in business relationships.""0 Such a suggestion might
lead corporate participants to conclude that they are suckers to obey
the rules when others do not. The business judgment rule, which affirms a standard of conduct much higher than the courts are willing
to enforce, may consequently be understood as a "second best" solution to the problem of opportunism in corporate relationships-a solution that recognizes that corporate law influences behavior not just
by imposing sanctions but also by shaping perceptions of what sort of
behavior is expected, appropriate, and common.""
As this argument illustrates, an analysis of corporate law that accounts for trust behavior and the signaling role of case law offers
theoretical support to the scholars who argue that law can serve an
"expressive function" and promote desirable behavior by changing
preferences as well as by changing payoffs."' At the same time, howship as competitive and untrusting, rather than cooperative and trusting. This signal
could reduce directors' willingness to look after shareholders' interests by suggesting
that shareholders and directors are not members of a common "ingroup." See upra
Part II.D.2 (discussing the importance of group identity to trust behavior).
IS See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning and Deterrence,83 VA. L. REV.
349, 352-54, 356-57 (1997) (discussing herd behavior and suggesting that when people
observe others committing crimes, they are more likely to commit crimes themselves).
Our analysis offers an interesting twist on Kahan's approach, which recommends that
policymakers reduce the incidence of observable crime through more active policing.
Id. at 395. In contrast, we note that, in the corporate context, director misconduct
usually cannot be directly observed by outsiders. As a result, active "policing" through
derivative suits makes such conduct observable and can increase the incidence of misbehavior. A similar phenomenon may explain management studies that have found
that when work environments are altered by adding visible monitoring (for example,
by adding video surveillance cameras), employees actually become more likely to engage in noncooperative behaviors such as stealing or shirking. Although this finding
cannot be reconciled with the neoclassical view that misbehavior should become less
common as the likelihood of detection increases, the negative effects of visible monitoring make more sense if employees interpret visible monitoring as evidence that
theirfellow employees are untrustworthy, and thus as a signal that their relationship with
their employer is a competitive rather than a cooperative game. See Bowles, supra note
75, at 80; see also Kramer, supra note 24, at 591 ("[Ilnnocent employees who are subject
to... mass screening designed to deter misbehavior may become less committed to
internal standards of honesty and integrity in the workplace.").
181 See Allison & Kerr, supra note 92, at 697 (noting that
social dilemma studies
suggest that one "promising strategy for promoting cooperative behavior in social dilemmas might consist of intentionally exploiting people's [beliefs about others' behavior] to facilitate positive outcomes for [the] group[]").
182 See, e.g., authorities cited supra note
14.
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ever, it cautions against a simplistic approach. Judicial pronouncements can influence behavior by sending a variety of signals. Some of
these signals may be intended; others may not. But all may have an
effect.
C. Trust Behavior,the Limits ofLaw, and the Case
of the Closely Held Corporation
We argue above that corporate law channels behavior not just by
imposing external sanctions, but also through social framing that encourages officers, directors, and shareholders to view their relationships as cooperative ones calling for other-regarding behavior. It
seems plausible, however, that in many circumstances corporate participants may perceive both the threat of legal sanctions and the framing effects of corporate case law as distant and relatively weak influences. Are there other, nonlegal forces that encourage and shore up
trust within firms? If so, how important is corporate law in influencing behavior?
We consider these questions below in the context of "closely held"
corpo-ations-firms with relatively few shareholders who also serve as
the firm's managers. ' As this description implies, closely held corporations generally do not suffer the "separation of ownership and control" thought to plague publicly held firms. 8' Closely held firms are
famous for presenting their own problems, however, in the form of
opportunistic behavior between shareholders."5 Moreover, the conventional tools used by shareholders in publicly held firms to patrol
against the agency costs imposed by professional managers-the
shareholders' rights to vote, to sell their shares, and to sue for breach
1

Although publicly held firms control the lion's share of corporate assets in the

United States today, the vast majority of incorporated entities are "closely held" corporations that are distinguished from publicly held firms by three characteristics: First,
they have relatively few shareholders; second, there is no active market for their stock;
and third, shareholders usually are not passive investors but also the firm's managers.
CASES AND
Sr CLARK, supra note 13, at 24-27; JOEL SELIGMAN, CORPORATIONS:
MIATERIALS 533 (1995).
l' S,r generally supra text accompanying note 39 (discussing the agency cost problen in publicly held firms).
" Shareholders in publicly held firms often share a relatively homogeneous interest in maximizing the economic return from their investment. They therefore have a
common interest in patrolling against managerial malfeasance. In contrast, share-

holders in closely held corporations often also serve as managers and, as a result, are
more likely to find themselves at odds with each other, giving rise to a second potential
layer of problems. Moreover, because their shares are not readily marketable, they are

"locked into" their investment more than shareholders in publicly held firms are.
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of fiduciary duty-are far less useful to shareholders in closely held
firms who want to protect themselves from each other."86
Legal scholars have long recognized that closely held corporations
present special governance problems above and beyond the agency
cost problem associated with publicly held firms. 8 7 In accord with the
contractarian tradition, scholars have also long argued that contract
provides the best solution. Thus, participants in closely held firms
have been thought to curb intershareholder opportunism primarily by
designing special agreements and charter provisions that alter the
shareholders' rights to vote, buy and sell their shares, receive dividends, or participate in the firm's management.* Yet these arrangements are widely recognized as providing, at best, a limited restraint
on intershareholder opportunism in closely held firms. No matter
how carefully they draft the corporate charter, participants in closely
held corporations remain mutually vulnerable. As Frank Easterbrook
and Daniel Fischel describe the problem:
[The] Drafters of the organizing documents of a closely held corporadon cannot avoid a tradeoff. On the one hand, they must provide some
protection to minority investors to ensure that they receive an adequate
return on the minority shareholder's investment if the venture succeeds.
On the other hand, they cannot give the minority too many rights, for
the minority might exercise their rights
189 in an opportunistic fashion to
claim returns at the majority's expense.

Consider the example of a closely held corporation formed by three individuals,
A, B, and C. A is the CEO, B is the CFO, and C is the Senior Vice President. Each
holds one-third of the firm's shares. Now suppose C is unhappy with the way the firm
is being run. (Perhaps she thinks her salary too small.) Unlike a shareholder in a
large publicly held firm who can "vote with her feet," C cannot exit by simply selling
her shares in a liquid market. Nor does her right to vote her shares give much comfort, given that she will consistently be outvoted by A and B. Finally, fiduciary duties
provide a notoriously dangerous form of protection for minority shareholders in
closely held corporations. Making it easy for the minority to sue the majority discourages the majority from opportunistically exploiting the minority's vulnerability. However, it also makes it easier for the minority opportunistically to exploit the majority. For
example, if C could sue A and B easily, she might regularly threaten to do so unless
they voted to raise her salary.
See sources cited supra note 42 (discussing these special problems).
in See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 13, at 763-80 (discussing share transfer restrictions
and voting requirements as a solution to intershareholder conflicts in closely held corporations); Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations,supra note 15, at 279 (discussing
high voting and quorum requirements and employment and compensation agreements as contractual responses to shareholder conflicts).
189Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations, supra note 15, at 285; see id. at 279
(recognizing that although contractual mechanisms have evolved to protect minority
shareholders, "[tihe more power minority shareholders have, the more likely is dead186
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Closely held corporations accordingly present an especially clear
example of circumstances in which legal and market forces impose
only weak restraints on opportunistic behavior within the firm. Yet
despite the high degree of mutual vulnerability their participants must
endure, closely held corporations continue to exist and, indeed, to
outnumber publicly held corporations vastly. This puzzling fact has
provoked legal scholars to suggest that some coordinating force other
than the threat of a lawsuit or the discipline of the stock market restrains opportunism in closely held firms. For example, in a recent
article, Professor Paul Mahoney proposed a norms-based model of
closely held corporations in which shareholder opportunism is constrained "by the possibility of non-legal sanctions, including family or
social disapproval and loss of reputation. "'.
For a number of reasons, however, such concerns seem unlikely to
curb misbehavior in most closely held corporations reliably. First,
closely held firms are often formed between individuals who have no
familial relation. Second, when factions within a closely held corporation begin to point fingers at each other, it can be difficult for outsiders to detennine who is at fault and ought to be socially "punished."
Third, it is unclear why outsiders would want to punish the transgressors at all."" Finally, although it is hard (but not impossible) to replace one's family, there is a ready supply of substitutes for most other
lock.... No way is costless."). In economic terms, the closely held corporation presents a classic problem of team production. See supra text accompanying notes 4045
(discussing team production). This is because participants in closely held corporations
usually invest large amounts of firm-specific financial and human capital. As a result,
they can only recover funds spent on business expenses and customized equipment, as
well as time and effort spent managing the firm, by waiting to share in the profits (if
any) that the firm generates. If they try to decide who gets what share of those profits
ex ante, they urill run into contracting problems. Yet if they wait to divide up the profits after they have been earned, there is no obvious way to decide ex post how to divide
the gains. Thus the majority may try to exploit the minority, or (if the firm's charter
provides for strong minority rights) the minority may try to exploit the majority.
I_ Mahoney, suna note 15, at 1. Easterbrook and Fischel have similarly suggested
that "[plarticipants in closely held corporations frequently have familial or other personal relations [that constrain] conflicts of interest." Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporatiwtl, supra note 15, at 274.
A related argument has been offered by Professors Edward Rock and Michael
Wachter and bv Professor Gordon Smith. These scholars have argued in recent articles that in prixately held "Silicon Valley" firms for which entrepreneurs often raise
capital by selling large blocks of stock to venture capital firms, the entrepreneurs often
rely on the venture capitalists' reputation for "fair play" as protection against opportunism. Sot Rock & Wachter, supra note 15, at 927-29; D. Gordon Smith, Team Productin'inl4ture CapitalInvesting,24J. CORP. L. 949, 969-70 (1999).
So, supra note 27 (discussing the puzzle of why third parties should enforce
norms iith social sanctions).
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social relationships.
The empirical phenomenon of trust may provide the missing
piece to the closely held corporation puzzle. To understand why, consider what happens in a firm in which the participants correctly perceive themselves and each other as both trusting and trustworthy. In
such a firm, each participant has to some extent incorporated the
others' welfare into her own preference function; the focus is on we
rather than L Knowing this, all will be less likely to feel either the
need for elaborate and expensive contractual protections ex ante or
the temptation to engage in wasteful squabbling over who gets what
ex post. Thus trust can reduce the costs of intershareholder opportunism in closely held corporations when legal rules (including the
rules of contract) and market pressures (including reputational concerns and the fear of social sanctions) fail to do so.
Trust only works, however, when one knows that one's fellow
shareholders in the firm are indeed trustworthy. This may be a dangerous thing to assume, given the empirical evidence reviewed in Part
II that not all individuals engage in trust behavior'
For trust to support cooperation in the absence of external enforcement mechanisms, it is essential for individuals inclined toward trust to be able
somehow to "filter out" those who are not. How can a would-be participant in a closely held corporation ensure that her fellow shareholders are worthy of her trust?
The problem parallels social scientists' concern over how cooperative behavior can evolve in social organisms when "cooperators" are
vulnerable to exploitation by "defectors. " "' At least two selection
mechanisms have been suggested in the literature, both of which may
apply to the formation of closely held firms. The first is the possibility
that trustworthy people are somehow able to detect, and so avoid doing business with, untrustworthy individuals. Robert Frank, for example, has argued that trustworthiness is associated with observable
characteristics, like involuntarily blushing when one lies.'
Reputation might perform a similar signaling function if a good reputation is
disproportionately expensive for untrustworthy individuals to acquire
because it requires them to pass up many tempting opportunities to
192See supra Part

II.B. Moreover, even among those inclined to trust, the behavior

is context-dependent and thus potentially unreliable. See supraPart II.D.
93 See supra note 36.
194

See ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON 9, 127-28 (1988); Robert H.

Frank, If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own UtilitY Function, Would He Want On,

with a Conscience?, 77 AM. ECON. REv. 593, 594-95 (1987).
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better themselves at others' expense. (Note that reputation matters
here, not because the threat of ruining a good reputation gives one
leverage to punish one's partner, but because a good reputation is
prima facie evidence of an intrinsically trustworthy character. 9")
It seems plausible that trustworthy individuals can indeed sometimes identify the untrustworthy by observation or reputation and so
avoid dealing with them. Certainly shifty eyes and a bad reputation
are usually disadvantages in the business world. But there is a second
process that may also work to exclude low-trust individuals from
closely held corporations. That process is self-selection.
This idea can be developed from an argument that has been offered byJohn Orbell and Robyn Dawes.'9" Orbell and Dawes's analysis
relies on the psychological phenomenon of projection-the human
tendency to assume others are like oneself.97 As noted earlier, there is
extensive empirical evidence that trustworthy people presume others
are trustworthy while untrustworthy individuals distrust others. This
phenomenon implies that people who are trustworthy are disproportionately likely to enter potentially rewarding relationships that require a high degree of vulnerability (for example, to participate in a
closely held corporation). Conversely, untrustworthy individuals are
more likely to pass up the opportunity to exploit their fellow shareholders in a closely held firm because they assume their fellow shareholders will try to exploit them."" The net result is that self-selection
works as a filter to ensure that individuals who opt into closely held
fit-ns are disproportionately trustworthy."'
1""Eric Posner has argued that people may also signal their trustworthiness
by giving gifts, dressing conservatively, and so forth. However, he suggests they do this primarily because they expect external rewards from future exchanges, rather than because of other-regarding preferences. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAw AND SOCIAL NORIMS
(2000); Eric A. Posner, S~mbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27J.
LEG XLSTUD. 765, 768-95 (1998).
P", St' Orbell & Dawes, supra note 71, at 526 (discussing the survival
advantages of
trust and positing models in which cooperators flourish because they project their own
attitudes onto others, and so are more willing to undertake trust-based production,
while defectors are too suspicious of others to do the same); see also Macy & Skvoretz,
supra note 71, at 640 (positing a similar evolutionary model in which cooperators avoid
interacting with defectors).
1'7 Se Orbell & Dawes, supra note 71, at 517.
See supra text accompanying notes 68-71.
See Orbell & Dawes, supra note 71, at 526 ("[O]ur model shows how entrepreneurs who intend honest cooperation can, in fact, end up ahead of those who intend
exploitation of potential partners.").
_-, Evidence to support this hypothesis includes experimental studies finding that
low-trust individuals who are given the option of participating in a social dilemma gen-
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The possibility that trust plays a foundational role in the economic
success of many closely held corporations and that both self-selection
and partner-selection tend to discourage untrustworthy individuals
from participating in closely held corporations can explain an interesting pattern commonly observed in closely held corporations! '
Closely held firms are usually formed when a small number of individuals agree to band together to pursue a joint enterprise. In effect,
the closely held corporation begins as an "incorporated partnership"
in which each partner contributes a valuable resource or skill. Although the firm's original founders could negotiate elaborate contracts to control their future interactions, they often do not, choosing
instead to assume that they can "work things out" if conflicts appear.
And often they do work things out. Problems tend to arise, however,
when the original founders of the firm die or retire and their interests
pass into the hands of their heirs and successors. At this point, squabbling becomes more common, and the new shareholders often find
themselves embroiled in litigation with each other.""
This pattern can be explained as a consequence of the fact that
while the original founders of a closely held firm are subject to selective pressures that favor trust-including both self-selection and partner-selection-their heirs and successors are not. The children of the
original founders acquire their shares even if they are shifty-eyed and
disreputable or even if they would never willingly choose to participate in an arrangement that required such a high degree of mutual

emily choose not to, while high-trust individuals tend to choose to play. This result is
informative because defectors benefit from playing a social dilemma with cooperators

and so should be more eager to play. See Orbell et al., Do CooperatorsExit?, supra note
70, at 147 (finding that cooperators are more likely to stay in the game).
201 See SELIGMAN, supra note 183, at 536 (noting that in a closely
held corporation,
"the relationship among the shareholders must be one of trust, confidence, and absolute loyalty if the enterprise is to succeed"); Richard A. Epstein, Contract and Trut in
Corporate Law: The Case of Corporate Opportunity, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 11 (1996)
("[Corporate participants'] best protection against the inconsistencies of taste and
temperament lies in their ability to select co-owners ....Most people know this. They
pick the partners first and worry about the contract later, not the other way around.").
202See, e.g., Lehrman v. Cohen, 222 A.2d 800 (Del. 1966) (regarding
a dispute over
the issuance of new stock arising after a son inherited his father's shares); Ringling
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441 (Del. 1947)

(addressing a dispute over the election of directors after wives inherited their husbands' shares); Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. 1964) (concerning a dispute over
the interpretation of a shareholders' agreement after a wife inherited her husband's
interest). This pattern strongly suggests that family and social ties alone are insufficient to constrain opportunism in closely held firms. See supra text accompanying
notes 190-92 (discussing the social-sanctions hypothesis).
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vulnerability./"' And without trust to play its essential gravitational
role, the unrestrained centrifugal forces of opportunism eventually
cause the firm to disintegrate.
By focusing on the role of selection pressures in furthering trust
in closely held corporations, we do not to mean to suggest that selection is irrelevant to trust in publicly held firms." 4 Rather, we seek to
demonstrate how a behavioral approach counsels humility in our assumptions about the relative importance of law in encouraging cooperation and discouraging opportunism in social institutions. The case
of the closely held corporation illustrates how business relationships
characterized by a high degree of mutual Vulnerability can survive and
thrive even when legal and market forces are largely absent or impotent. As importantly, it suggests how attempts to discourage opportunism by appealing to the law can sometimes backfire and lead to an
increasein misbehavior.
To understand why, let us return to the observation that participants in closely held corporations often decline to draft complex contracts to control their future dealings, instead preferring to deal with
conflicts informally as they arise. To some extent, this reflects the inevitable difficulties of contracting under conditions of risk and uncertainty. In some cases it may also reflect ignorance, lack of imagination, or poor legal advice. The phenomenon of trust behavior
suggests, however, that sometimes participants in closely held corporations may deliberately choose not to draft formal contracts, even when
they could do so.'5
-"'
The absence of selection among second-generation participants in a closely
held corporation can lead to patterns of distrust even when the founders' successors
are, in fact, relatively trustworthy. This is because it may be difficult for them to prove
this to each other when participating in the firm did not require an affirmative decision to make themselves vulnerable, and so to signal their trustworthiness by themsehes displaying trust.
-", Indeed, the institution of the publicly held firm may
perform a hithertounrecognized function by allowing trust behavior to persist beyond the life of the
firm's founders, as employees, managers, and other human participants in the firm
place their trust in the infinitely-lived institutional entity itself. See supra note 110 and
accompanying text (arguing that individuals can display trust behavior with nonhuman
entities such as "the company"); see also Roderick M. Kramer, Cooperationand Organizatiomal Identification, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS: ADVANCES IN THEORY

AND RESERCH 244 (J. Keith Murnighan ed., 1993) (arguing that people are more
likely to behave cooperatively in firms when they share a sense of group identity with
the organization itself).
See LEWIS, supra note 8, at 263-64 (describing how large corporations in joint

Nentures based on trust often deliberately choose to draft only simple and incomplete
contracts).
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They do this because they recognize, at an intuitive level, the importance of selecting intrinsically trustworthy partners. In screening
for trustworthiness, it is useful to pay attention not only to reputation
and general demeanor, but also to present behavior. Suppose a
potential business partner shows up armed with a lawyer and a tenpage contract loaded with fine print. What does that behavior suggest? Most obviously, a reluctance to trust. And given the empirical
association between a willingness to trust and a willingness to behave
trustworthily, revealing a fear to trust unavoidably signals one's own
206
Participants in closely held corporations accorduntrustworthiness.
ingly may often decline to negotiate complex formal contracts
because doing this would destroy the filtering value of mutual vulnerability as a means of excluding the intrinsically untrustworthy.2 7
This is not to say that contract is never useful in forming closely
held firms. For example, negotiating and drafting a contract encourages would-be joint venturers to communicate more clearly what each
wants to get out of their relationship. This makes it easier to take
account of each other's preferences because those preferences are
better known. It can also help avoid the sort of nasty surprises that
undermine trust in a long-running relationship. (If your partner does
something that you do not like, it can be difficult to tell if this happened because she was mistaken about what you wanted or because
she knew what you wanted but was indifferent to your welfare.) In
many closely held firms, this information-providing aspect of formal
contracting may be at least as important as the threat of legal
sanctions contract appears to bring into play.
But the reality of trust behavior cautions against the conventional
assumption that opportunism in firms (including but not limited to
206

This analysis focuses on the possibility that formal contracting encourages

intrinsically untrustworthy persons to participate in closely held corporations or, at
least, leads trustworthy persons to perceive this as a risk. It also seems likely that
explicit contracting can undermine trust between two individuals who each view the
other as potentially trustworthy because it frames their developing relationship as an
arm's-length one that calls for competitive rather than cooperative behavior. See
Bowles, supra note 75, at 95, for a suggestion that cooperation is more likely when
people see contracts as being incomplete, and describing experiments in which
trust in and commitment to trading partners as well as a concern for one's
own and others' reputations emerges when product quality is variable and
non-contractible but not when it is contractible.... These experimental results suggest that trust or reciprocity may depend on the form of the contract, contractual incompleteness leading to trusting and reciprocal behaviors ....
267 Similar considerations may explain why so few married couples
negotiate prenuptial agreements.
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opportunism in closely held firms) always is best addressed by bringing the force of the law and of formal contract into play.2's Negotiating and enforcing contracts is always expensive. Such expense may be
unnecessary in relationships based on trust, at least when selection
pressures work to exclude the intrinsically untrustworthy. Worse, attempts to use contracts in relationships in which trust plays a central
role can prove counterproductive and promote exactly2 9the sort of opportunistic behavior they were intended to discourage. 0
CONCLUSION

Economic theory has yielded great insights into the nature of the
business firm and the role the law plays in shaping it. At the same
time, conventional economic analysis has proven inadequate to resolve a number of important debates and questions in corporate law.
These include the nature of corporate fiduciary duties, the mechanism by which judicial opinions influence corporate participants' behavior, and the puzzling persistence of cooperative patterns of behavior in business situations (most obviously closely held firms) in which
legal and market forces seem too feeble to rein in opportunism.
In this Article we offer an explanation for these and other riddles
of corporate law. Our approach does not reject economic reasoning.
It does, however, reexamine one of its standard assumptions: the assumption that people always behave like homo economicus. We argue to
-"-Although our analysis focuses on the possibility that formal contract can undermine trust in closely held corporations, similar arguments can be made about attempts to control opportunism in closely held firms by making it easier for shareholders to sue each other for breach of fiduciary duty. For example, Eric Talley has
recently argued that making it easier for shareholders in closely held corporations to
bring claims of breach of duty might be inefficient because it creates incentives for
them to spend resources on monitoring each other rather than on corporate production. See Talley, supra note 15, at 1005. Our analysis supplements Talley's by suggesting a second reason why such monitoring is undesirable, namely, that it signals that
one does not trust one's partner and, correspondingly, that one may not be trustworthy oneself. Cf David M. Kreps, Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives, 87 AM.
ECON. REV., May 1997, at 359, 359 (noting that high levels of monitoring and highpowered incentives may reduce trust and destroy loyalty).
In this vein, a newly emerging literature examines whether attempts to use formeal contract to encourage cooperation can in some circumstances actually reduce cooperation by "crowding out" trust. See, e.g., Iris Bohnet et al., More Order with Less
Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding (July 27, 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors). See generally Laura Poppo & Todd Zenger, Substitutes or Complements? Exploring the Relationship Between Formal Contracts and
Relational Governance 3 (Apr. 27, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract-id=223518.

1808

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 149: 1735

the contrary that people often behave as if they care about costs and
benefits to others. In support of this claim, we review the extensive
empirical evidence that has been developed on human behavior in
social dilemma experiments. This evidence demonstrates that most
people shift readily from purely self-interested to other-regarding
modes of behavior depending on past experience and present social
context. Under the right circumstances, people can be counted upon
with some degree of predictability to trust and to behave trustworthily,
even when presented with economic incentives to do otherwise.
Relaxing the assumption that people are always self-interested in
favor of the more realistic claim that people have a capacity for socially contingent, other-regarding behavior opens new channels for
analyzing a wide variety of relationships in which the law seeks to encourage cooperation and discourage opportunism. These include not
only relationships within families and among citizens in the broader
community but also business relationships like partnerships, relational
contracts, and (our focus here) incorporated firms.
We emphasize that we are not suggesting that legal rules, explicit
contracts, and market sanctions are unimportant in governing business relationships. Social science confirms what most of us already
know-not everyone can be counted upon to engage in cooperative,
other-regarding behavior, no matter what social cues they are given.
Moreover, even among people inclined to behave cooperatively, trustbased relationships sometimes break down, and competitive behavior
sometimes yields better individual and group outcomes. In many
situations, external incentives are still important and perform exactly
the function contractarian theory assumes they perform-to promote
cooperation and rein in uncooperative, untrustworthy behavior.
But the experimental evidence on trust teaches that human behavior can be influenced in a number of ways that are not captured by
the standard nexus of contracts analysis. This observation carries important implications for corporate scholars, for it suggests that an understanding of trust behavior may be an essential foundation for a
solid understanding of corporate law. Without taking account of
trust, we cannot fully comprehend or explain the substantive structure
of corporate law, how it channels behavior, or where its limits lie.
This is a matter of concern not only for academics but also for
judges, legislators, practicing lawyers, and businesspeople. Mistaken
assumptions about the role and importance of external incentives in
furthering cooperative behavior can lead not only to mistaken descriptions but also to mistaken prescriptions. In particular, the ex-
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perimental evidence warns that attempts to provide external motivations for cooperative behavior can instead reduce cooperation by undermining corporate participants' internalmotivations. In this Article,
for example, we have explored why making it easier to sue corporate
directors for breach of the duty of care might actually reduce levels of
care, if a proliferation of such lawsuits carries the unintended message
that carelessness is common behavior. Similarly, we have suggested
that using formal contracts to constrain shareholder opportunism in
closely held firms can increase the likelihood of exploitative behavior
by interfering with the natural filtering effect of self-selection under
conditions of mutual vulnerability.
Indeed, trust can be undermined not only by using external incentives but even by using the language of external incentives. The
experimental evidence demonstrates that individuals trying to decide
whether to trust and behave trustworthily are exquisitely sensitive to
the social signals they receive about what sort of behavior is expected
and appropriate in a given context. 10 Language is such a signal. As a
result, language can promote trust. We have argued here, for example, that judicial opinions encourage trustworthy behavior among
corporate participants not only by promising external rewards and
punishments but also by describing certain relationships within the
firm as fiduciary relationships that call for other-regarding conduct.
But language can also erode trust.21 In particular, employing the
rhetoric of contract can undermine trust among corporate participants by implying that trustworthy behavior is not important, not
common, and not expected .212
This last observation raises troubling questions about the dominance of contractarian talk in corporate law scholarship. What is
needed is a more tempered and nuanced approach to analyzing corporate law, an approach that recognizes the multidimensional quality
of human nature. Human beings are individualistic and social crea"1'See supra text accompanying notes 77-81 (discussing how cooperation rates in

social dilemma games range from 5% to over 95%, depending on players' perceptions
of social context).
;11 Indeed, there is reason to suspect that language may be more effective at destroying trust than creating it. See supra text accompanying note 104 (discussing the
fragility of trust).
412 Our arguments are not inconsistent with the contractarian view, writ broadly.

Shareholders, managers, and employees who participate in and make themselves vaulnerable in firms likely expect some personal benefit in the short or the long term. We
suggest, however, that if corporate participants actually did sit down to negotiate their
relationships in their mutual self-interest, one of the contractual terms they might
choose would be a reluctance to rely upon and use the language of contract.
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tures. They are capable of acute rationality and cognitive error. They
are driven by self-interest and (in the right circumstances) by concern
for others. They can be suspicious, greedy, and untrustworthy, as conventional economic analysis assumes. But they are also capable of
trusting and being trustworthy, and reliably so. A solid understanding
of the social and economic circumstances that elicit trust behavior is
accordingly vital to our understanding of a wide range of social and
legal institutions, including corporations and corporate law.

